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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers approaches to influencing population opinions during counterinsurgency 
efforts in Afghanistan.  A discrete time, agent-based threshold model is developed to analyze the 
propagation of beliefs in the social network, whereby each agent has a belief and a threshold 
value, which indicts the willingness to be influenced by the peers.  Agents communicate in 
stochastic pairwise interactions with their neighbors.  A dynamic, two player game is formulated 
whereby each player strategically controls the placement of one stubborn agent over time in 
order to maximally influence the network according to one of two different payoff functions.  
The stubborn agents have opposite, immutable beliefs and exert significant influence in the 
network.  We demonstrate the characteristics of strategies chosen by the players to improve their 
payoffs through simulation.  Determining strategies for the players in large, complex networks in 
which each stubborn agent has multiple connections is difficult due to exponential increases in 
the strategy space that is searched.  We implement two heuristic methods which are shown to 
significantly reduce the run time needed to find strategies without significantly reducing the 
quality of the strategies.  Lastly, we introduce population-focused actions, such as economic 
stimulus projects, which when used by the players result in long-lasting changes in the beliefs of 
the agents in the network. 
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1 Introduction 
During the 20
th
 century, nations on all continents have experienced or intervened in 
insurgencies.  While several counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have proven successful, many 
have failed miserably.  However, the strategic victory over an insurgency does not instantly 
validate the operational and tactical methods used by the counterinsurgents, nor does it make 
them applicable for universal use in all COIN operations [1].  Since 2001 the United States has 
been consumed with ongoing counterinsurgency operations, most notably in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Due to the nature of insurgencies, whereby the insurgents limit the effectiveness of 
conventional warfare by blending in with the civilian population in order to protect themselves, 
counterinsurgents must adapt their traditional military tactics in order to successfully defeat the 
insurgents.  Thus, substantial emphasis has been placed on winning the support of the civilian 
population in order to deny the ability for insurgents to have refuge amongst the masses. 
1.1 Motivation for Research 
The motivation for this research stems from the focus that is placed on winning popular 
support during counterinsurgency operations.  The U.S. military is confronted with the difficult 
task of gaining the popular support of the populace during its COIN operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Because the United States has limited resources and personnel, crucial decisions must 
be made by military commanders on which key civilian leaders to engage in an effort to 
optimally influence the entire civilian population.  Therefore, this research analyzes the complex 
problem of choosing which key leaders to engage by implementing a dynamic two-player 
“chess” game on a social network, whereby the two players (US military and Taliban 
insurgents), who have immutable (stubborn) beliefs try to influence the beliefs of the mutable 
agents in the network toward supporting their cause. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
The rest of this thesis is divided into five additional chapters.  In Chapter 2 we discuss the 
nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and specifically, the inherent struggle to win 
popular support during counterinsurgency operations.  In Chapter 3 we first discuss previous 
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work which has been devoted to the field of belief propagation in social networks.  We present 
enhancements to previous modeling approaches by introducing the formulation of a peer-
pressure threshold model and dynamic two-player game.  In the network model, mutable agents 
are assigned a scalar belief between -0.5 (heavily pro-Taliban/anti-US) and +0.5 (heavily pro-
US/anti-Taliban).  The two stubborn agents (Taliban and US) have immutable beliefs of -0.5 and 
+0.5, respectively.  All agents in the network are assigned different levels of influence depending 
upon their position in society.  The stubborn agents exert the most influence in the network as 
they try to influence the mutable agents in the network to adopt their extreme beliefs.  Stochastic 
pairwise interactions occur between neighboring agents in the network, whereby influence is 
spread through the network as agents change their beliefs according to interaction-type 
probabilities and the characteristics (i.e. peer pressure effect) of the threshold model.  Due to the 
presence of stubborn agents, which have immutable beliefs of different values, and the stochastic 
pairwise interactions, the beliefs of the mutable agents end up being random variables over the 
course of the discrete-time model. 
During the two-player game, a US agent and a TB agent are concerned with finding 
connection strategies to mutable agents in the network in order to maximally influence the 
network toward support their cause.  Both stubborn agents are given alternating opportunities 
during the game to reevaluate and update their strategy given the current strategy of their 
opponent and the beliefs of the mutable agents in the network.  In Chapter 3 we also introduce 
two heuristic methods (‘Selective Search’ and ‘Sequential Search’) which drastically reduce the 
computational time needed to find solutions during the two-player game.  We show that as the 
complexity of the problem increases (i.e. each player is allowed multiple strategy connections to 
agents in the network), the ‘Sequential Search’ method is necessary as exhaustive enumeration 
and ‘Selective Search’ do not scale well due to exponential increases in the potential strategy 
space.   
In Chapter 4 we present key observations supported by empirical evidence about the 
characteristics of strategies chosen by the players to maximize their payoffs.  Experiments also 
show the sensitivity of the solutions to various model parameters as well as different payoff 
functions used by the players.  Moreover, we show that the use of ‘Sequential Search’ to find the 
best solutions for complex problems does not significantly sacrifice the quality of those obtained 
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solutions when comparing them to the solutions found by the exhaustive enumeration and 
‘Selective Search’ methods.  The last section of Chapter 4 is devoted to the introduction of 
population-focused actions available to the US and TB agents in order to influence the 
propagation of beliefs in the network.  The US agent is allowed to conduct stimulus projects, 
such as building schools, roads, or wells, as well as giving money for economic projects, while 
the TB agent is allowed to use assassinations.  Experimental evidence shows that the use of 
stimulus projects or assassinations can have long-lasting impacts on the network beliefs.  These 
long-lasting impacts are due to the peer pressure effect which is built into the threshold model 
and makes agents highly unlikely to change their beliefs away from their neighbors’ beliefs.  
Finally, Chapter 5 is devoted to introducing interesting areas for future research while Chapter 6 
summarizes the work presented in this thesis and offers some conclusions. 
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2 The Battle for Popular Support between Insurgencies and 
Counterinsurgencies 
The United States is known as having one of the most highly capable, conventional 
military forces in the world due to the presence of high-technology weapons and superior air, 
land, and sea forces.  World War II and Operation Desert Storm showcase prime examples where 
the United States exerted conventional military tactics with much success.   However, since the 
1960s, the United States has been actively involved in supporting counterinsurgency efforts in 
countries all over the world, such as Vietnam, Somalia, Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and most recently, Afghanistan and Iraq.  Due to the landscape of irregular warfare 
during counterinsurgency operations, whereby the use of military forces in a conventional sense 
is limited, the United States has been forced to alter and adapt the use of its military force in 
order to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical goals against the insurgencies.  Political 
power is the key issue which is sought by insurgents and counterinsurgents as both sides strive 
for popular support of the people.  As such, the U.S. Army states that the “primary objective of 
any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate 
government,” which is obtained by winning the support of the general populace [2].  
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, who is a general in the U.S. Army tasked 
with writing doctrine for the Army, recently wrote: 
The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on 
battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by 
forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will 
be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, 
and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success [3]. 
As General Caldwell mentions, future wars will not be fought on open battlefields with large 
conventional military forces, but will rather be fought over gaining the allegiance and support of 
the population.  Therefore, the success of the United States during its current (and future) 
counterinsurgency efforts will undoubtedly hinge upon the ability for the United States to perfect 
its strategies for engaging the populace, while simultaneously thwarting the ability for insurgents 
to gain prominent footholds as legitimate authorities. 
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2.1 The Nature of Insurgencies 
The United States military defines an insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at 
the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” [2].  
Insurgents conduct organized politico-military operations in a protracted environment in order to 
weaken the control and legitimate power of the established government.  Insurgents use all 
methods available to them in order to gain political power and support from the population as 
legitimate authorities.  These tools include, but are not limited to, political, informational (such 
as appeals to ideological, ethnic, or religious beliefs), militaristic, and economic.  The most 
common approaches to warfare used by insurgents are terrorist and guerrilla tactics.  While 
insurgents would prefer quick and overwhelming victory rather than a long and protracted 
struggle, the latter often occurs due to the significant disadvantage insurgents face in terms of 
resources and technology to fight on the open battlefield [2]. 
 Although each insurgency is unique in its specific motives, many similarities exist among 
them.  In every case, insurgents strive to cause political change and the use of military force in 
order to achieve such change is secondary in nature and only used as a means to an end.  
Moreover, protracted conflicts only serve to favor insurgents as no other approach seems too 
make better use of such asymmetry than conducting a protracted popular war.  Many historical 
insurgencies used the protracted warfare approach in order to eventually wear down the enemy 
and secure victory—examples include the Chinese Communists in conquering China after World 
War II, as well as the North Vietnamese and Algerians.  Additionally, the United States has 
similarly been exposed to the protracted mindset of the insurgents they face as some Al Qaeda 
leaders have suggested such approaches in their propaganda writings [2]. 
Mao Tse-tung’s Theory of Protracted War 
 Mao Tse-tung is known as being the ‘father of modern insurgency’ due to his 1937 book 
On Guerilla Warfare which outlined how the Chinese people should organize and conduct 
unlimited guerilla warfare on the Japanese invaders of China during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War.  His theory of protracted war outlines three strategic phases that should be used by 
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insurgents in order to eventually wear down and eventually defeat the enemy, namely (1) 
Strategic Defensive, (2) Strategic Stalemate, and (3) Strategic Counteroffensive [2, 4].   
Phase I – Strategic Defensive 
During Phase I, the insurgency is in a dormant state which is focused on survival and 
building support for its cause.  Insurgents in this phase are much weaker than the government 
which has superior strength in forces.  Thus, insurgent leaders establish base camps and gain 
support from the population through the use of propaganda, boycotts, sabotage, and 
demonstrations.  Major military combat with the enemy is avoided during this phase as the 
primary focus is establishing the insurgent movement among the populace by creating logistical 
support networks, finding recruits, and gaining intelligence on the enemy.  Army Field Manual 
(FM) 3-24 highlights a list of key objectives which are accomplished by the leaders of the 
insurgency during this phase [2]: 
 Recruit, organize, and train cadre members 
 Infiltrate essential government organizations and civilian groups 
 Establish cellular intelligence, operations, and support networks 
 Solicit and obtain funds to support the movement 
 Develop sources for outside support 
Lastly, during the later stages of Phase I, the insurgency may decide to establish a counterstate 
(or shadow government) which is in opposition to the established government authority and 
designed to replace the existing government [2].  
Phase II – Strategic Stalemate 
 Phase II is characterized by the expansion of insurgent military forces and overt guerrilla 
warfare.  The objective of the insurgency during this phase is to undermine the people’s support 
of the government while at the same time expanding their areas of control.  The insurgents 
attempt to delegitimize the government by showing the people that the government is incapable 
of maintaining control of the country and protecting its people.  They accomplish this by 
attacking government forces to show their ineffectiveness while simultaneously conducting 
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aggressive propaganda campaigns and information operations to influence the populace.   Phase 
II is a combination of military actions by both sides against each other and a simultaneous fight 
for the support of the people.  The military actions of the insurgents have two main purposes—
(1) to decrease the fighting capability of the other side, and (2) to convince the people that the 
insurgents are stronger and more worthy of support.  Due to the massive recruiting efforts during 
Phase I (and continuing throughout the insurgency), the insurgents have enough military force to 
enable them to concentrate their resources for short periods in order to locally overwhelm 
government forces.  However, the insurgents cannot concentrate their forces indefinitely in any 
one area and must be able to effectively hide their forces among the people in order to prevent 
their destruction by the government’s superior firepower [2]. 
In Phase II the insurgency gains popular support in many ways.  First they conduct 
attacks against government targets (security forces, infrastructure, and individuals), which show 
the impotence and ineffectiveness of the government, while highlighting the strengths of the 
insurgents.   Shadow governments established by the insurgents in areas they control provide 
services (mainly through conflict resolution, legal, and financial means, not infrastructure) and 
security for their supporters and work to supplant local government by showing the 
incompetence of the government.  Large information campaigns against the government further 
erode popular support.  Throughout Phase II the insurgent is focused on simultaneously 
strengthening himself and weakening the government through protracted conflict [2]. 
Phase III – Strategic Counteroffensive 
 Finally, Phase III is designated by the insurgency as a counteroffensive period whereby 
the insurgents sense weakness in the established government authority.  The insurgents transition 
from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare during the counteroffensive movement as they aim 
to destroy the enemy’s military capability and will to fight.  Success in Phase III is determined 
largely by armed conflict, and not propaganda or popular support.  However, failure of the 
insurgent in Phase III does not mean its destruction.  Success or failure is often decided quickly 
in Phase III as it is readily apparent that one side or the other is stronger and military success 
often rapidly follows [2]. 
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 If the counteroffensive movement is successful and the insurgents begin to gain control 
of portions of the country they become responsible for the population, resources, and territory 
under their control.  Thus, as the balance of power shifts from the government to the insurgents, 
it is important for the insurgents to maintain the support of the people by: 
 Creating an efficient civil administration 
 Establishing an effective military organization 
 Providing balanced social and economic development 
 Mobilizing the population to support the insurgency 
 Protecting the population from hostile actions 
A triumphant insurgency does not, however, depend on the sequential or successful application 
of all three stages.  The overall objective of any insurgency is to achieve political power.  
Therefore, if the insurgency is unsuccessful in a later phase it can easily revert back to an earlier 
stage until a new opportunity presents itself for transition into the next stage.  Moreover, 
insurgents are not required to follow Mao Tse-tung’s exact formula for protracted war in order to 
be successful.  Recent insurgencies, such as the Algerians, have been successful without the use 
of large-scale conventional warfare.  Thus, counterinsurgents are faced with a significant 
challenge in defeating insurgents due to the nature of insurgencies which, although have similar 
end objectives of gaining political power, can be very different in their specific characteristics, 
strategies, and tactics used against the government [2]. 
2.2 The Nature of Counterinsurgencies 
The United States Army Field Manual 3-24 defines a counterinsurgency as “military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 
defeat insurgency” [2].  Because political power is the central issue fought over by insurgencies 
and counterinsurgencies, counterinsurgents will use all available instruments of national power 
in order to maintain the established or fledgling government from losing its legitimacy.  Thus, 
even though the main purpose of America’s military is to fight and win wars for the United 
States, while at the same time securing and defending the nation from potential adversaries, the 
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unique nature of counterinsurgency efforts requires the U.S. military to adapt to a different 
landscape of conflict. 
Counterinsurgents must not only be ready to fight, but also to build and provide security 
for the population.  COIN operations consist of a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability 
operations, whereby the exact proportion of effort devoted to each will change over time 
depending on the current situation.  The protection, welfare, and support of the populace are 
crucial to the success of any counterinsurgency effort due to the intelligence gained from the 
local people in identifying and eventually rooting out the insurgents.  Thus, counterinsurgencies 
should place significant focus on isolating the insurgents from their cause and support because it 
is “easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent” 
[2].  Although killing and capturing insurgents is necessary during COIN operations, attempting 
to eliminate every insurgent is impossible and can also be counterproductive in terms of 
producing popular resentment and/or creating martyrs which increase the number of new recruits 
seeking revenge.  Therefore, only after popular support has been won by the counterinsurgents 
will the insurgency be conquered as (1) the reliance on external support, (2) the need for secrecy 
in base camp operations, and (3) the capability of hiding amongst the populace are three key 
vulnerabilities facing insurgencies which can be thwarted by intelligence gained from the 
population supporting the cause of the counterinsurgency [2].  
2.3 Nonlethal Targeting used to Win Popular Support 
Any insurgent movement requires the support of the populace in order to survive, let 
alone to succeed in overthrowing the government.  In order to grow and gain strength, an 
insurgency requires a sufficiently sized population base which will actively support the growth.  
Thus, one of the most effective ways for counterinsurgents to defeat the insurgents is to 
efficiently shrink the population base supporting the insurgency by causing the local populace to 
become hostile or at least apathetic towards the insurgents [5].  As previously discussed, 
insurgents heavily rely on safe havens within the communities in order to remain hidden from 
government forces.  These safe havens, however, only exist whenever sufficient numbers of the 
local population support the insurgents [2]. 
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During the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents, there will be a minority of 
people who actively support each side and a majority of people who are either passive in their 
support or are indifferent toward either side.  This concept is best illustrated below in Figure 2.1 
from Army Field Manual 3-24.2 [5].  The three main components (active support, passive 
support, and indifferent) are described in further detail below. 
 Active Support:  Active supporters view the side they support as the legitimate 
authority, and they personally or publically align themselves with this side.  Besides 
joining the militia, active supporters of an insurgency may participate in a wide array of 
other activities in support of their side including: spreading propaganda, giving financial 
support, offering medical assistance or safe havens, providing intelligence or logistical 
support, and recruiting others to join the cause [2].  Meanwhile, active supporters of the 
existing government may join the military or police force, provide intelligence to the 
counterinsurgents, and spread propaganda denouncing the insurgents [6]. 
 Passive Support:  Passive supporters are those people who are sympathetic toward one 
side yet who remain inactive and non-hostile towards those you are not sympathetic 
toward their cause.  Passive supporters of the insurgency are those who allow insurgents 
to conduct operations in their local proximity and remain silent (or give false 
information) if asked by counterinsurgents about intelligence concerning insurgent 
activity [2].  Passive supports of the counterinsurgents obey the rule and laws of the 
government and may support COIN operations against the insurgents if there is minimal 
risk [6]. 
 Indifferent:  Indifferent individuals are those who represent a large portion of the 
population.  They are unsure of which side to support and have a tendency to either (1) 
remain neutral until there is clearly a victor, or (2) cater to whoever has a stronger 
presence in their proximity [2]. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Spectrum of Popular Support [5] 
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 While both the insurgents and counterinsurgents are vying for support of the populace, 
the proportion of popular support that is needed for each side to be victorious is very different.  
Because insurgents can easily create disorder and havoc, the counterinsurgents must usually 
obtain much greater than 50 percent of the popular support.  Meanwhile, a largely passive 
populace may be all that is necessary for an insurgency to be successful and seize political power 
[2].  Thus, in order to effectively eliminate an insurgency, counterinsurgents must focus their 
efforts on achieving a great majority of the popular support through nonlethal targeting methods, 
such as personal communications, negotiations, and meetings with the population, especially 
with those individuals who are passive or indifferent. 
 Although lethal targeting may be necessary, the success of any counterinsurgency 
ultimately hinges on the ability to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace through nonlethal 
targeting strategies.  ‘Hearts’ refers to the ability to persuade the people that their best interests 
are served by counterinsurgency success, whereas ‘minds’ means convincing the population that 
the government force can protect them and that resisting the COIN effort is pointless [2].  
However, because the U.S. military has limited resources and personnel, critical decisions must 
be made by ground forces on whom to selectively target with the end goal of winning the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of the most people.  Although the U.S. Army’s two primary field manuals on 
counterinsurgency (FM-3-24 [2] and FM 3-24.2 [5]) combine for more than 500 pages of COIN 
doctrine, of which roughly 50 pages discuss targeting, the advice given for how an Army unit 
should specifically determine which individuals to target and how to engage them is quite vague.  
Together, these two manuals state the following: 
 Identify leaders who influence the people at the local, regional, and national levels. 
 Win over passive or neutral people. 
 Nonlethal targets include people like community leaders and insurgents who should be 
engaged through outreach, negotiation, meetings, and other interactions. 
 Meetings conducted by leaders with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose 
perceptions, decisions, and actions will affect mission accomplishment can be critical to 
mission success. 
 Start easy…Don’t try to crack the hardest nut first—don’t go straight for the main 
insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages 
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that support the insurgents.  Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. 
Do this by extending your influence through the locals’ own networks. 
 
The task of determining which people to target at any given time is difficult.  Successful 
nonlethal targeting tactics used in one COIN effort may not produce the same results when used 
in another COIN operation, which is why it is impossible for a manual to give deterministic 
formulas for nonlethal targeting strategies.  Thus, the Army manuals only provide general, 
experienced-based guidelines and approaches for how Army commanders should determine 
which local leaders to target. 
This thesis focuses on arguably the most important aspect of any counterinsurgency 
effort—the extremely difficult task of determining which individuals to engage through 
nonlethal means in order to gain the most support of the populace.  The objective of this thesis is 
to formulate a realistic, peer-influence social network to model the population of a rural 
Afghanistan district, and subsequently develop decision tools to help military commanders 
decide which individuals to engage through nonlethal targeting techniques.  The proposed 
methods seek to determine the impact of different targeting strategies on the population’s 
attitudes over time with the goal of maximizing the beliefs of the populace in support of the U.S. 
counterinsurgency cause. 
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3 Modeling Approach and Formulation 
We begin Chapter 3 by with a literature review of belief propagation in social networks.  
More specifically, we discuss the foundational modeling approach proposed by Acemoglu et al. 
[7] and Hung [8] as well as shortcomings of the model which have inspired the development of 
our model.  Lastly, we discuss the formulation of a dynamic, two player “chess game” approach 
whereby U.S. forces and Taliban insurgents attempt to maximally influence the beliefs of the 
people in the network in a transient environment. 
3.1 Literature Review 
Below we discuss the major work done in the field of modeling societal networks and the 
diffusion of information in such networks. This literature serves as the foundation of our 
modeling approach. 
3.1.1 Influential Leaders in Social Networks 
The key to understanding the problem of belief propagation in social networks is first to 
understand the characteristics of the network and how information flows from one person to the 
next.  Katz and Lazarsfeld [9] led the way in the field of social science and public opinion 
formation through the creation of their ‘two-step flow’ model of communication.  They theorized 
that individuals in society may in fact be influenced more by the exposure to one another than by 
their exposure to the mass media.  Thus, they argued that a small minority of influential ‘opinion 
leaders’ act as liaisons between the media and the rest of society—hence, the ‘two-step’ process.  
It is these influential leaders who have the greatest access to media as well as a better 
understanding of the content.  In turn, each opinion leader shapes and molds the media’s content 
and diffuses the information to the people they wield influence over—as the followers of opinion 
leaders tend to share the same interests, demographics, personalities, and/or socio-economic 
factors.  As such, the idea of focusing political campaigns on influencing the attitudes of 
influential leaders, and not the attitudes of the critical masses, stemmed from the work done by 
Katz and Lazarsfeld as it is the influential leaders who are responsible for spreading information 
and shaping the beliefs of the masses. 
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Since the foundational work of Katz and Lazarsfeld, many have offered both criticisms 
and follow-on support for the two-step communication model.  Watts and Dodds [10] question 
how precisely influential leaders exert their influence over their followers in society.  They seek 
to determine “exactly how, or even if, the influentials of the two-step flow are responsible for 
diffusion processes…or other processes of social change.”  Watts and Dodds do not entirely 
discount Katz and Lazarsfeld’s two-step model, since their research finds examples supporting 
the idea that opinion leaders are responsible for generating significant ‘cascades’ of influence.  
However, they believe this is the exception and not the general rule, as they find that influential 
leaders are “only modestly more important than average individuals.”  As such, they claim that 
the main factor which drives belief propagation in social networks is not the opinion leaders, but 
rather by easily influenced individuals in turn persuading other easily influenced individuals.  
This notion directly relates to the ideas behind the cascade and linear threshold models, which 
will be discussed shortly. 
3.1.2 Opinion Dynamics 
While several researchers have developed methods for understanding the social aspect of 
belief propagation and the roles of opinion leaders, others have developed mathematical models 
to simulate and analyze how information spreads through a social network.  In 1964, Abelson 
[11] created a network model such that pairwise interactions occur between agents in the 
network which are adjacent to one another (i.e. interactions are only able to occur between 
agents who know each other, and such adjacency connections resemble those relationships and 
enable a way for information to be shared or obtained).  As two agents interact with each other, 
the resulting outcome is a function of the two agents’ original beliefs as well as their 
persuasiveness.  While Abelson’s work was an initial step towards a field of much uncertainty, 
he does mention the limitations of his model since all agents eventually reach a consensus 
agreement on their opinions which is not necessarily realistic in society. 
Later, in 1974, DeGroot [12] used Markov chain theory to model opinion dynamics in 
society.  Each agent predetermines weights for each of his neighbors (adjacency connections) 
from which he/she obtains information.  For instance, if agent   believes agent   is a 
knowledgeable expert on the subject matter, then agent   will choose a sufficiently large weight 
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(    ) for his connection between agent  .  For all agents and their edges, these weights are 
obtained and comprise what is known as a one-step transition probability matrix of a Markov 
chain.  What makes the transition probability matrix interesting is that the matrix is stochastic 
since all rows must sum to one.  Because of this, DeGroot notes that “if all recurrent states of the 
Markov chain communicate with each other and are aperiodic, then a consensus is reached.”  
This consensus opinion is calculated as the sum product of the steady-state probabilities (which 
can be determined because all recurrent states of the chain communicate and are aperiodic) and 
the initial opinions.  Even though DeGroot mentions how a consensus is not reached should the 
recurrent and aperiodic condition not be met, his consensus-driven approach to the attitudes of 
agents in a network is not necessarily appropriate in a realistic setting as people have diverse 
opinions on all matters and do not always reach a consensus.  
Moving forward, Acemoglu et al. [7] developed the spread of (mis)information model 
which is a stochastic, agent-based network model with two types of agents—regular and 
forceful.  As such, forceful agents in the network are those agents which have a positive 
probability of forcefully imparting their belief on other agents, while regular agents do not have 
such a capability.  Pairwise interactions between adjacent agents occur according to two 
probabilistic features—(1) the frequency of their interactions and (2) the type of interaction 
which occurs, whether it be averaging (both agents average their beliefs), forceful (one agent 
influences another), or identity (no change in belief).  The authors mention the importance of the 
assumption that “no man is an island” which essentially states that no agent is completely 
unaffected by the beliefs of those around him.  Because of this assumption, in which even 
forceful agents (with possibly vastly different starting opinions) are capable of being affected by 
the beliefs of the rest of society, the network beliefs arrive at a consensus among all agents; 
however, such a consensus is a random variable as the beliefs converge to a convex combination 
of the initial scalar beliefs. 
More recently, Hung [8] added to the existing model developed by Acemoglu et al. [7] by 
creating a ‘very forceful’ agent class (who are even more influential than the ‘forceful’ agents) as 
well as a set of ‘stubborn’ agents with beliefs that are static and never change.  Thus, the 
‘stubborn’ agents are the most forceful (influential) agents in the network and effectively diffuse 
their beliefs throughout the network.  Because of the presence of ‘stubborn’ agents, the beliefs of 
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the agents in the network never converge to a single value.  However, Hung was able to 
characterize a well-defined first moment for the random variables of each agent’s belief.  Over 
time, the expectation converges to an equilibrium value, which means that the belief of each 
agent converges in expectation to a fixed value in a sufficient amount of time.  Lastly, although it 
is mentioned that the beliefs of the agents do not converge to fixed values in simulation (once 
again, due to the presence of ‘stubborn’ agents), Hung does show that the beliefs converge to a 
type of stochastic equilibrium such that the average of all agent beliefs in the network oscillate 
around the expected mean belief of the network. 
Hung also made two other important contributions—(1) he created a network generator 
tool and (2) he developed a non-linear, non-convex, mixed integer mathematical formulation to 
solve the complex problem of finding stubborn agent placements in order to maximally influence 
the network.  The network generator tool was created in a collaborative effort between Hung and 
the MIT Political Science Department.  The tool is designed to create realistic social interaction 
networks among Pashtun local leaders in a rural Afghanistan district.  We will extensively use 
this network generator tool for the experiments and analyses conducted in Chapter 4.  The inputs 
to the generator include information and intelligence that would hopefully be accurately gathered 
by counterinsurgents during interactions with the local population.  These inputs would include: 
(1) determining who the local leaders are and their specific roles in society, (2) an estimation of 
the attitudes of the local population (the specific context to be discussed later), and (3) how many 
Taliban agents there are and with whom do they interact with and influence.  The network 
generator tool takes these inputs and creates homophily connections between agents who are 
likely to interact with each other based on socio-demographic features.  The resulting network 
created contains a list of agents and their connections in an undirected graph denoted as   
     .  Next, based on the network which is created (including the locations and connections of 
the Taliban ‘stubborn’ agents), Hung’s mathematical program would determine the optimization-
based placement for U.S. ‘stubborn’ agents in order for the U.S. agents to maximally influence 
the network based on the long-term expected attitudes of the agents. 
Howard [13] subsequently determined that Hung’s placement solutions for U.S. stubborn 
agents were local optimums based on his results analyzing the same problem with a new 
approach.  Howard created a two player game which used a simulated annealing heuristic to look 
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for Nash equilibrium solutions (whereby neither stubborn agent can improve his payoff by 
unilaterally deviating from the current strategy).  His algorithm employed ‘best response 
dynamics’ in a back-and-forth updating game until Nash equilibria were either found to exist or 
not exist.  Although Howard mentions the limitations of simulated annealing (no guarantee of 
finding global optimum solutions and problems dealing with cases that contain multiple 
equilibria), he does point out that not only were his solutions better than Hung’s, but that his 
simulated annealing heuristic was much faster, too. 
Both Hung and Howard contributed greatly to the problem of modeling rural Pashtun 
villages in Afghanistan and formulating programs to determine optimization-based placements of 
stubborn agents in order to maximally influence the network.  However, in this thesis we take a 
new approach to this problem, and we present reasons for improving their models in the 
following section as we attempt to reach a more realistic setting in terms of the modeling 
approach and the two player game. 
3.1.3 The Need for a More Realistic Model 
There are several areas of improvement concerning the previous models presented by 
Hung and Howard which we address here.  First, one of the characteristics of the previous 
models was that the long-term expected beliefs are independent of the initial beliefs of the 
mutable agents in the network.  Hung and Howard both found that the long-term expected 
attitudes only depend on the underlying influence parameters and topology of the network 
(particularly the placement of stubborn agents).  From a real world point of view, this finding 
seems unrealistic, especially if we view two extreme cases of the same network with different 
initial conditions—(1) every agent’s initial belief is -0.5 (pro-Taliban), except for the U.S. 
stubborn agent which has an immutable belief of +0.5, and (2) every agent’s initial belief is +0.5 
(pro-United States), except for the Taliban agent which has an immutable belief of -0.5.  In the 
previous implementations, both extreme cases would yield the same expected long-term beliefs 
through both the analytical expression and simulation, assuming enough interactions are allowed 
to occur for the network beliefs to converge to a quasi-equilibrium state.  Reasonably, one would 
anticipate entirely different long-term beliefs for these two extreme cases as other factors, such 
as peer pressure, will affect the degree to which an agent is willing to change his or her belief.  
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Thus, if a network is highly concentrated with like-minded agents, we expect the agents in the 
network to remain close to these initial beliefs despite outside influence from a stubborn agent of 
an opposing belief.  This leads us to propose incorporating peer pressure into the model which 
will affect belief propagation during pairwise interactions. 
An important aspect which was not included in the previous models was the effect peer 
pressure can play in how influence propagates through the network.  For example, one may be 
more likely to change their current opinion about an issue given 90% of their friends now hold a 
new opinion versus the same scenario whereby only 10% of their friends hold the new opinion.  
We believe peer pressure plays an integral part in affecting attitude dynamics and should thusly 
be included in the social influence model. 
Next, Howard’s two-player game approach was concerned with finding Nash equilibria.  
In this situation, opposing stubborn agents would play a back-and-forth game connecting to 
agents until (hopefully) a pure Nash equilibrium strategy was found whereby both agents would 
settle on the same targeted agent and exert equal, polar-opposite influence on the particular 
agent.  The opposing stubborn agents (Taliban and United States) would not be inclined to 
unilaterally deviate from the Nash equilibrium strategy as doing so would be unbeneficial 
towards their respective payoffs.  The problem with this implementation is two-fold.  First, it is a 
very strong and possibly unrealistic assumption that Taliban insurgents and U.S. ground forces 
would be content on ‘talking’ to the same local/district leader in order to influence them (and the 
rest of the Pashtun village(s)) toward supporting their cause.  Second, even if the U.S. and 
Taliban agents were to settle on the same agent to influence, one would not expect equal 
influence to be exerted by both stubborn agents on the targeted agent as an inherent bias toward 
supporting one side would most likely occur rather than indifference toward both sides.  We 
therefore will consider enhancements that will put pressure on stubborn agents to select different 
strategies during the course of the two-player game. 
Finally, both Howard and Hung concentrated on modeling and understanding the long-
term expected attitudes of the network as the network beliefs reach an asymptotic equilibrium 
state.  In a constantly-changing, dynamic world, analyzing the long-run equilibrium state of the 
network seems unrealistic.  We should instead be concerned with the transient state of the 
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network to enable quick strategy changes given short-term information on the state of the 
network.  Therefore, we seek to implement a two player game centered on the transient 
environment in a back and forth ‘chess game’ whereby the opposing stubborn agents consistently 
reevaluate and update their strategies as necessary. 
Based on the proposed areas of enhancement for the model, we seek guidance from 
literature on different social influence models which may be better suited for creating more 
realistic models of society. Furthermore, we also seek literature which focuses on the transient 
behavior of belief propagation in social networks rather than the long-term asymptotic equilibria. 
3.1.4 Cascade and Threshold Models 
Schelling [14, 15] discusses how discriminatory individual behavior can lead to 
segregation, separation, or sorting in society.  Such discriminatory behavior can be a conscious 
or an unconscious awareness to age, religion, sex, color, etc. that influences the decisions people 
make about where to live, where to sit, what job to get, and with whom to talk to and associate 
with.  Schelling creates models in which members of two distinct ‘color’ groups make 
discriminatory choices about their locations based on the identities of their neighbors.  Thus, an 
individual will move if he is not satisfied with the ‘color’ mixture of his neighborhood.  
Schelling mentions some individuals may be more tolerant than others, and thus, it takes a higher 
percentage of their neighbors to be of a different ‘color’ group before they become unsatisfied 
and change their location.  Because of the inherent preference for people to be surrounded by 
others who are similar to themselves, Schelling shows how people can promote segregation 
through their individual discriminatory choices of everyday life.  Lastly, Schelling touches on a 
topic called neighborhood ‘tipping’ which occurs when a new minority enters a particular 
neighborhood in sufficient enough numbers to cause the previous majority group to begin 
evacuating and relocating as the ‘tipping point’ is reached and they eventually become the 
minority. 
In 1978, Granovetter [16] expanded on the initial segregation models created by 
Schelling and proposed the threshold model as an approach for modeling societal networks.  He 
argued that an individual’s behavior depends on the number of people who are already engaging 
in such behavior, which thus gives notion to the way peer pressure influences behavior and 
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opinions.  Therefore, every person has their own ‘behavioral threshold’ which is the proportion 
of friends which must participate in some action before he or she will be convinced or persuaded 
to participate in the same action.  Thus, an individual with a ‘threshold’ of 0% would be 
classified as an ‘instigator’ since 0% of that person’s friends would need to previously be 
partaking in the desired behavior before he or she decides to as well.  Meanwhile, people who 
are more conservative in nature will have higher thresholds—e.g. 80% to 90%.  Since people are 
assumed to act rationally in order to maximize their utility, their individual ‘threshold’ values 
should be the point at which the perceived benefits of holding some opinion or doing some 
action outweigh the cost of not doing so. 
Recently, Kempe et al. [17] discussed the problem of maximizing the expected spread of 
an idea or behavior within a societal network due to the presence of ‘word-of-mouth’ referrals.  
He introduced two stochastic influence models – the independent cascade (IC) model and the 
linear threshold (LT) model.  In the IC model, Kempe et al. assigned each edge an activation 
probability and influence is spread in the network by activated nodes independently activating 
their inactive neighbors based on the activation probabilities.  Meanwhile, the LT model assigns 
weights to each edge as well as threshold values to each node.  In this process, a node will 
become activated if the weighted sum of its active neighbors exceeds its individual threshold 
value.  Kempe et al. proved that the influence maximization problem in both the IC and LT 
models are NP-hard.  They also developed a greedy algorithm for the models which successively 
selects the node with the maximum marginal belief propagation.  Lastly, they showed that their 
greedy algorithm approximates the optimal solution within a ratio of        , or 63%.  This 
approximation ratio stems from the nice properties (monotonocity and submodularity) of the 
belief propagation function used by the models. 
3.1.5 Transient Behavior of Belief Propagation in Social Networks 
Ozdaglar and Yildiz [18] studied the optimal placement of stubborn agents in order to 
maximize the spread of opinions in the transient setting.  They assumed an undirected network 
G, with a set of stubborn agents of belief zero,   , with known locations, and well as the initial 
beliefs of the remaining nodes in the network (either type 0 or type 1).  Their goal was to choose 
k nodes (not including   ) to form the stubborn agent set    such that the bias of the network is 
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maximized after l steps, where            .  Ozdaglar and Yildiz produced several 
conclusions for the influence maximization problem for the transient case—(1) it is always 
optimal to target nodes with type 0 beliefs rather than type 1 beliefs, (2) optimal target nodes 
ideally have a large number of neighbors with small neighborhoods, and (3) the neighborhoods 
are dominated by nodes with belief type 0.  They noted that their results are valid when 
maximizing the expected belief of the network for one step into the future.  
3.2 Proposed Threshold Network Model Formulation 
In the previous section, we mentioned areas of enhancement to be explored from the 
preceding models developed by Hung and Howard.  Thus, the intent of the current modeling 
formulation is to address those areas with the following measures—(1) the long-term beliefs of 
the mutable agents in the network should be dependent on the initial beliefs of those mutable 
agents, despite the presence of stubborn agents, (2) peer pressure should affect the outcome of 
belief exchanges during pairwise interactions, (3) the appeal of identical strategies among 
opposing stubborn agents (U.S. and Taliban) should be diminished during the two player game, 
and most importantly (4) we concentrate our focus on studying the transient behavior of the two-
player game whereby continual readjustments can be made by both opposing stubborn agents as 
the game progresses.  The proposed formulation adds additional insights into the field of social 
influence models and how belief propagation is affected due to various modeling parameters. 
3.2.1 Scope of the Model 
Hung’s large, 73 node (excluding stubborn agents) network model, which is created 
through the use of his network generator tool, is designed to accurately represent an Afghanistan 
district composed of several villages.  Districts in Afghanistan are typically comprised of 10-20 
villages, each of which contains approximately 100 households or more.  We limit ourselves to 
modeling one Pashtun district in Afghanistan throughout this thesis for three reasons.  First, U.S. 
Army company commanders deal with the problem concerning this thesis—how to maximally 
influence a rural Pashtun district—and thus, we attempt to mimic the role of an Army company 
commander by focusing our analysis on only one district.  Second, a much larger network 
spanning many districts in Afghanistan can make the optimization aspect of the problem very 
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tedious and time consuming.  Finally, Afghanistan districts tend to follow historical tribal and 
social boundaries of which it is believed that the opinions of villagers in one district are greatly 
independent of the opinions of villagers in another district [13].  Thus, networks containing 
multiple districts might be deemed unnecessary as sequential analyses of individual districts may 
be just as accurate. 
3.2.2 Network Characteristics 
We assume we are given an undirected network,        , where   represents the set 
of agents (i.e. individuals, nodes, or vertices) and   is the set of connections (i.e. edges or arcs) 
between those agents.  Throughout our analysis we assume the topology of the network is static 
such that no agents are added to or removed from the network over the time horizon we are 
concerned with in the experiments.  Because we are focusing our analysis on the transient (short-
term) behavior of the network, rather than the long-term behavior (as Hung and Howard had 
previously analyzed), the assumption of a static network structure is more believable.  We do 
make two exceptions to the notion of creating a static network structure.  First, stubborn agents 
are allowed to change their connections (arcs) to different mutable agents over the course of the 
two player dynamic game in an attempt to maximally influence the network beliefs toward 
supporting their cause.  Second, special cases involving the Taliban stubborn agent whereby they 
‘assassinate’ an agent in the network will temporarily decrease the forcefulness (influence) level 
of that agent.  Both of these exceptions will be discussed later. 
3.2.3 Agents Characteristics 
3.2.3.1 Belief Spectrum 
We assign each agent in the network a scalar belief on the continuous spectrum from -0.5 
to +0.5 (see Figure 3.1 below).  This belief indicates how favorable or unfavorable an agent is 
toward the United States (US) or Taliban (TB).  For example, an agent who has a belief of -0.5 
strongly favors the Taliban (and is heavily opposed to the US), while an agent with a belief of 
+0.5 is strongly supportive of the US (and is heavily opposed to the TB).  Meanwhile, an agent 
with a belief of 0 (neutral) is indifferent toward both sides. 
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Figure 3.1 – Agent Belief Spectrum 
 
3.2.3.2 Forcefulness (Influence) Level 
Moreover, each agent is assigned a particular forcefulness or influence level depending 
on the type of person they are in society, which directly relates to their job or role in society.  We 
describe the four types of influence levels below: 
Regular 
 A regular agent is an agent who is a head of household in a rural Pashtun village.  
Typically, the head of household is the eldest male within a family and is the only voice of the 
house that matters during important tribal meetings.  In Pashtun society, it is not uncommon for 
more than one generation to live under the same roof, which can amount to up to 40 people 
living in the same house [19].  While there may be minor disputes between individuals of the 
same household, we assume that the belief of the eldest male (head of household) accurately 
represents the belief of everyone living in the house, especially due to the fact that the society is 
highly patriarchal.  As such, regular agents have the lowest level of influence of all agents in the 
network, but they realistically represent all of the family members who reside under one roof.  
Regular agents are represented as squares in the network diagrams. 
Forceful 
 Forceful agents are village leaders which hold more influence than the ‘regular’ head of 
household agents within a village.  Although forceful agents are also most likely to be the head 
of a household, their role in society gives them further influence than regular agents.  Some 
examples of forceful agents include local (village) religious figures, members of the Shura 
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(advisory council in rural Pashtun society), or wealthy merchants.  Forceful agents are depicted 
as upside-down triangles in the network diagrams.  
Forceful+ 
 Forceful+ agents are even more influential than forceful agents.  They represent more 
central and powerful individuals in Pashtun society, such as district government officials, district 
religious figures, or the district police chief.  Because forceful+ agents are often more centrally 
located within the network, they wield influence beyond just the village setting.  Forceful+ 
agents are represented as triangles in the network diagrams. 
Stubborn 
Stubborn agents are the most influential agents in the network.  Also, stubborn agents are 
the only agents in the network with immutable (unchangeable) beliefs.  There are two stubborn 
agents in the network (one US agent representing military ground forces with belief +0.5 and one 
Taliban agent representing insurgents with belief -0.5).  We assume that the US and TB have 
immutable beliefs of +0.5 and -0.5 because it is unlikely that either opposing stubborn agent can 
effectively influence and change the belief of the other stubborn agent.  The goal of each 
stubborn agent is to maximally influence the beliefs of the mutable agents (regular, forceful, and 
forceful+) in the network toward supporting their cause.  Stubborn agents are depicted as 
diamonds in the network diagrams. 
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Lastly, we represent all agents in the network through the following set notation found 
below.  Agents belong to specific sets based on their forcefulness level. 
                             
                              
                               
                        
                         
                                      
                                                 
                                            
                                                    
 
 In Figure 3.2, we represent a general network diagram to illustrate the various concepts 
discussed thus far.  Note that the current belief of each agent is represented by the color of their 
respective node symbols, which is based on the color spectrum shown in Figure 3.1. 
 For the convenience of the reader, Appendix A contains a list of all variable notation and 
their definitions introduced in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.2 – Example Network Diagram and Symbol Notation 
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3.2.4 Pairwise Interactions 
We assume all agents have an identical Poisson process with rate 1.  Thus, conditioned 
on the fact that an arrival has occurred in the network, it has an equal probability of having 
arrived in any agent’s Poisson process.   
 
                                                                    
                                                                          
                                                                    
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
When an arrival occurs in a particular agent’s Poisson process, it becomes the active 
agent in the network and will subsequently search for one of their neighbors to interact with.  We 
assume that all neighbors of the active agent have an equal probability of being selected for a 
pairwise interaction with the active agent. 
 
                                                                                       
                                                                                       
                 
                                                             
                                                                       
 
    
     
     
  
 
 Although some agents may be more inclined to interact with a particular neighbor(s) due 
to prior good relationships and/or proximity to one another, we do not allow a non-uniform 
distribution for the selection of neighbors for the active agent to choose from.  We rely on the 
use of a uniform distribution in order to simplify the model.  Also, due to a lack of sufficient 
information and data in order to revise this neighbor selection distribution, we feel a uniform 
distribution is the best alternative.   
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Furthermore, we denote the belief of agent   at time step   as                 .   A 
time step is defined as the occurrence of one pairwise interaction in the network.  Thus, time step 
  is defined as the  -th interaction in the network, and time step 0 is defined as the initial state of 
the network.  The vector           denotes the beliefs of all agents in the network at time 
step      
                          
  
 
  
 After the active agent (agent  ) selects one of his neighbors (agent  ) at random, one of 
three possible interaction types will occur: 
 
I. Forceful Interaction ( -type interaction) 
With probability      agent   will attempt to ‘forcefully’ impart        of his belief on 
agent    where    represents the threshold value of agent  .  Several outcomes can occur 
during a forceful interaction which will determine how agent   will update his belief.  We 
will explain this and the meaning of an agent’s threshold value later in more detail when 
we describe the formulation of the proposed threshold model. 
 
II. Averaging Interaction ( -type interaction) 
With probability      agent   and agent   will each attempt to reach a consensus equal to 
the average of their prior beliefs.  Either one, both, or neither agent will update their 
belief to the average of their prior beliefs.  Such outcomes depend on the threshold 
values of both agents as well as the prior beliefs of their neighbors (again, to be 
discussed formally later). 
 
III. Identity Interaction ( -type interaction) 
Lastly, with probability                , both agents exhibit no change in their 
prior beliefs.  This can best be describe as two individuals interacting with each other, 
yet they both disagree with the opinions of each other and are unwilling to change their 
own belief, or perhaps they both have identical beliefs prior to the interaction, and thus, 
there is no reason to change their beliefs. 
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Specifying the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma (         ) Values 
 We previously mentioned the four levels of influence that can be assigned to an agent in 
the network (regular, forceful, forceful+, or stubborn).  The idea of implementing the different 
levels of forcefulness in the network is to enable more powerful leaders in society to have a 
greater probability of spreading their ideas in the network, while at the same time making it more 
likely that regular agents (and other less forceful agents) will have a greater probability of 
adopting the idea of a more influential person rather than the idea of a lesser influential person.  
Figure 3.3 (below) shows the          and     values for all possible interactions between agents 
based on their level of influence—represented by the symbol notation which was discussed 
earlier.  In total, there are 16 different sets of          and     values—i.e. the active agent (agent 
 ) can be one of four possible levels of influence, and he interacts with agent  , who can also be 
one of four different influence levels. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Default Values 
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 For instance, looking at the first entry of the top-left table in Figure 3.3, we see that if a 
regular (square) agent is the active agent and interacts with another regular (square) agent, then 
they have a 100% chance of having a  -type (averaging) interaction.  Meanwhile, the next entry 
shows that if a regular agent is the active agent and interacts with a forceful (upside-down 
triangle) agent then they have a 100% chance of having a  -type (identity) interaction due to the 
fact that a regular agent is assumed not to be able to forcefully influence the belief of an agent 
with a higher level of influence.  Note that order matters (i.e. who is the active agent and who is 
the neighboring agent that is selected by the active agent) when determining the specific          
and     values.  Additionally, we make the assumption that all agents of the same level of 
influence have the same          and     values.  Although we agree agents of the same 
influence level may have different          and     values (which might be more accurately 
obtained through interpersonal relationships with such individuals), due to lack of information 
we use the same values for all agents of the same influence level in order to simplify the model. 
The default set of alpha, beta, and gamma values (Figure 3.3) were originally designed by 
Hung [8] to realistically mimic the types of interactions which occur between individuals in 
Pashtun societies in Afghanistan.  The experiments in Chapter 4 will use these default values, but 
we will also experiment with different values in the parameter sensitivity analysis section for 
other types of societies, such as western, hierarchical, and consensus societies.  Now that we 
have established the general network characteristics, agent characteristics, and types of pairwise 
interactions, we are ready to discuss the explicit formulation of the proposed threshold model. 
3.2.5 Formulation of the Threshold Model 
In this section, we detail the modeling approach and formulation of the threshold model 
which is designed to incorporate the concept of peer pressure into the interactions between 
agents.  Thus, not only will the forcefulness (influence) level and belief of each agent determine 
the propagation of beliefs in the network during a pairwise interaction, but the beliefs of the 
neighbors of both agents engaging in a pairwise interaction will also influence the outcome 
(change in beliefs, if any) of such interactions.  The threshold model naturally implements the 
effect peer influence has on interactions between agents by assigning all agents a specific 
threshold value               .  The threshold value,     is the proportion of agent     
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neighbors who must have beliefs either greater than (case 1) or less than (case 2) agent     prior 
belief in order for agent   to agree to change his belief toward the desired direction (either 
greater than or less than agent     prior belief).  Therefore, we can interpret    as agent 
    willingness to be persuaded by the beliefs of his peers.  The higher an agent’s threshold 
value, the less likely he will be influenced during a pairwise interaction to change his belief away 
from the beliefs of his peers.  For example, a threshold value of 0.1 means at least 10% of the 
agent’s neighbors must have an attitude in the desired direction (greater than or less than) in 
order for the agent to be persuaded to update his belief toward the desired direction of pairwise 
communication. 
We establish the threshold values for each agent depending on their individual level of 
influence.  Thus, the higher an agent’s level of influence is, the higher their threshold value will 
be.  The assumption behind this stems from the notion that the more influential an agent is in the 
network, the more unlikely they will be to succumb to peer pressure from their neighbors, 
especially from those neighbors of lesser influence level.  Thus, we establish the following 
threshold values for the agents in the network: 
    
         
              
       
  
Note that the threshold value for the stubborn agents is only intended to be a placeholder, 
as stubborn agents have immutable beliefs which never change, and thus, peer pressure does not 
affect their beliefs.  In Chapter 4, we experiment with different threshold values, including 
random assignment of threshold values, to determine the impact (if any) on the targeting 
strategies used by the stubborn agents. 
3.2.5.1 Variable Notation and Definitions 
Before we explain the formulation of the threshold model simulation procedure, we 
define the key variable notation and give their definitions (see Table 3.1). 
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Notation Description 
                                                        
                                                                      
                              
                              
                                                            
                
                                            
                                                                                   
                                                                                   
                 
                                                                  
                 
                                                                  
                                         
                                                                                         
    
                                                                                   
                    
    
                                                                                      
                    
                                              (since agents cannot interact with themselves) 
 
Table 3.1 – Variable Notation Used In Threshold Model Simulation 
 
3.2.5.2 Threshold Simulation Procedure 
We now detail the threshold simulation procedure.  More specifically, we describe the 
possible belief exchanges which can occur during the three types of pairwise interactions.  As 
previously stated, once an agent is selected as the active agent (agent  ), he randomly chooses 
one of his neighbors (agent  ).  Next, the two agents will randomly, yet probabilistically, engage 
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in one of the three types of interactions (either forceful, averaging, or identity) depending on the 
specific          and     values. 
 Once the type of interaction has been selected, we determine the new beliefs for agents   
and     The previous models proposed by Hung [8] and Howard [13] are based on the same types 
of interactions, namely forceful (alpha), averaging (beta), and identity (gamma).  However, in 
both of their modeling approaches, the belief exchange outcomes (formulas) which determine the 
interacting agents’ new beliefs were slightly different in comparison to those used in the 
proposed threshold model.  We first present Hung and Howard’s pairwise interaction belief 
exchange formulas below: 
Forceful (α-type interaction): 
With probability      agent   ‘forcefully’ imparts         of its attitude on agent  :            
                                                       
                               
                
                                                                         
In ‘forceful’ interactions the parameter     is a rating of stubbornness for each agent. This 
parameter represents the amount of their own belief an agent will retain after being forcefully 
influenced by another agent. For simplicity this is assumed to be identical for all agent pairs.  
                          
Averaging (β-type interaction): 
With probability    , they reach a consensus equal to the average of their prior attitudes: 
                 
           
 
 
Identity (γ-type interaction): 
With probability    , both agents exhibit no change in attitude:   
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    Due to the properties of the threshold model, modifications are required to the previous 
belief exchange outcomes resulting from pairwise interactions.  In the threshold model, belief 
exchanges during pairwise interactions are determined not only by the prior beliefs of agents   
and    but also by their individual threshold values as well as the beliefs of their neighbors.  Thus, 
more possible outcomes may occur during the interactions which we must account for.  We 
detail the specific belief exchange outcomes (formulas) for each type of interaction in the 
proposed threshold model below: 
I.                     If an alpha (forceful) interaction occurs (which happens with 
probability    ) the following belief outcomes are possible: 
 
A. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent   forcefully imparts (    ) of his 
belief on agent  , while agent  ’s neighbors (excluding agent  ) impart    of their 
average belief on agent  : 
 
              
           
                
          
              
(3.1)  
   
B. If condition ‘A’ does not hold and            , then with probability        
agent   forcefully imparts        of his belief on agent  : 
 
              
                              
(3.2)  
 
C. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent   forcefully imparts (    ) of his 
belief on agent  , while agent  ’s neighbors (excluding agent  ) impart    of their 
average belief on agent  : 
 
              
           
                
          
              
(3.3)  
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D. If condition ‘C’ does not hold and            , then with probability        
agent   forcefully imparts        of his belief on agent  : 
 
              
                              
(3.4)  
 
E. If no previous conditions hold, then no change in belief occurs: 
 
              
              
(3.5)  
 
II.                    If a beta (averaging) interaction occurs (which happens with 
probability    ), the following belief outcomes are possible: 
 
First, we determine if agent   will change his belief to the consensus average of the two 
agents’ prior beliefs, or if no change in belief will occur for agent  .  
 
A. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent  ’s new belief is the average of the 
two agents’ prior beliefs: 
 
         
           
 
 (3.6)  
 
B. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent  ’s new belief is the average of the 
two agents’ prior beliefs: 
 
         
           
 
 (3.7)  
 
C. If neither conditions ‘A’ or ‘B’ hold, then no change in belief occurs for agent  : 
 
              (3.8)  
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Next, we determine if agent   will change his belief to the consensus of the two agents’ 
prior beliefs, or if no change in belief will occur for agent  . 
 
D. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent  ’s new belief is the average of the 
two agents’ prior beliefs: 
 
         
           
 
 (3.9)  
 
E. If              and 
          
         
   , then agent  ’s new belief is the average of the 
two agents’ prior beliefs: 
 
         
           
 
 (3.10)  
 
F. If neither conditions ‘D’ or ‘E’ hold, then no change in belief occurs for agent  : 
 
              (3.11)  
 
III.                      Lastly, if neither an alpha (forceful) or beta (averaging) 
interaction occurs, then agents   and   will engage in a gamma (identity) interaction since 
we define:              .    The only outcome of the gamma interaction is 
presented below as both agents maintain their prior beliefs: 
   
              
              
(3.12)  
 
 Finally, once the new beliefs of agents   and   are determined, we update the network 
belief vector for the next interaction time step,               Note that only the indices for 
the two interacting agents (agents   and  ) can possibly change when we compare      to 
         The beliefs of all other agents will remain the same.  Once the belief vector        
has been determined, a new active agent is randomly selected and the same process is repeated 
until the desired number of pairwise interactions have occurred in the network. 
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 Thus, we see from the models proposed by Hung [8] and Howard [13] that regardless of 
the characteristics of the two interacting agents and the beliefs of their neighbors, the new beliefs 
of the interacting agents are solely dependent on the type of interaction and the prior beliefs of 
the interacting agents.  Meanwhile, the presence of the threshold model, in which peer pressure 
affects agents’ decisions on whether or not to update their beliefs, forces us to implement 
additional outcome possibilities for the alpha (forceful) and beta (averaging) interactions since 
these interactions not only involve threshold values, but also the beliefs of the neighbors of each 
interacting agent.  During all three types of interactions in the threshold model, if the criteria is 
not satisfied to enable an agent to update his/her belief, then no change in belief is seen from 
interaction   to       We see examples of such outcomes in equations (3.5), (3.8), and (3.11). 
3.3 Transient, Dynamic Two-Player Game Description 
With the detailed simulation procedure of the threshold model, we describe below the 
implementation of the two-player transient, dynamic game involving the two stubborn agents—
the U.S. and Taliban.  We discuss the main assumptions about the model with respect to the 
formulation of the two-player game, followed by the objective of the game and its parameters. 
3.3.1 Assumptions 
In formulating the two-player game on the social network, we make the following key 
assumptions: 
1. ‘No man is an island’ [7] in the networks which are created by the network 
generator tool, which means that each network is connected such that there exists 
a direct or indirect path from every node to all other nodes in the network.  
Moreover, this assumption means that every agent in the network communicates 
with and is capable of being influenced by someone else in the network (with the 
important exception that stubborn agents have immutable beliefs). 
2. The social network has static edges such that all agents and their locations are 
known throughout the entirety of the game.  We make one exception to this 
assumption in that stubborn agents may update their connection strategies during 
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the game as they see fit, which allows for the edges from stubborn agents to be 
dynamic in this sense. 
3. The same number of connections by each stubborn agent to mutable agents is 
predetermined at the beginning of the game and will remain the same throughout 
the entire game. 
4. All agents in the network have an equal, uniform probability of ‘being selected’ as 
the active agent for pairwise interactions. 
5. The influence-type probabilities are known and remain constant among all agents 
of the same influence level. 
6. Lastly, we use Monte Carlo simulations for determining the propagation of beliefs 
in the network over time. 
3.3.2 Dynamic Game Parameters 
Next, we define the various parameter inputs and settings for the dynamic game which 
are determined by the user. 
3.3.2.1 Number of Realizations 
 The number of realizations refers to the number of replications or iterations of the Monte 
Carlo simulation for the pairwise interactions of the threshold model.  We have found that 
generally 30 (sometimes even less) realizations of the Monte Carlo simulation give an accurate 
picture of the evolution of beliefs in the network over time.  
3.3.2.2 Number of Steps 
 The number of steps can be interpreted as the total number of ‘turns’ or ‘moves’ to be 
allowed by the stubborn agents during the game.  During a step, only one stubborn agent (either 
US or TB—whoever’s turn it is) may evaluate their current strategy (which includes looking at 
their opponent’s strategy since we assume a perfect information game) and subsequently decide 
what their new strategy is during the current turn based on this information.  For instance, if the 
number of steps in the game is 10, each stubborn agent will be given five steps (or turns) during 
the game during which they may update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff.  The 
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steps during the game follow an alternating pattern between the two opponents such that no 
stubborn agent is allowed to make two moves in a row. 
3.3.2.3 Expected Number of Interactions per Step (μ) 
 The expected number of interactions per step (μ) is simply the number of pairwise 
interactions which are expected to occur during each step of the game.  This can be interpreted as 
the number of interactions we expect to occur during each step before the opposing stubborn 
agent wishes to update his strategy, and thus, end the current step (turn) of the other stubborn 
agent.  The number of interactions per step follows a normal distribution with a mean (μ) and 
standard deviation (σ).  By allowing variability to exist in the number of interactions per step, we 
add more flexibility to, and increase the realism of, the two-player game.  We discuss the 
standard deviation parameter, σ, next. 
3.3.2.4 Standard Deviation of the Number of Interactions per Step (σ) 
 The standard deviation of the number of interactions per step (σ) is an input into the game 
and determines how much variability and uncertainty exists in the number of interactions per 
each step in the game.  During the experiment analysis in Chapter 4 we analyze a more 
symmetric game, whereby each stubborn agent ‘receives’ an equal amount of interactions per 
step, and thus, we set    . 
3.3.2.5 Number of Connections per Stubborn Agent ( ) 
 As previously discussed, each stubborn agent has the same number of connections 
(strategies), which is predetermined at the start of the game.  Once a stubborn agent selects a 
strategy at the beginning of one of his steps (turns) in the game, the next opportunity to update 
his strategy will be after the subsequent completion of the opposing stubborn agent’s next step.   
3.3.2.6 Initial Connection Strategy for One Stubborn Agent 
 In order to initiate the start of the game, we must set an initial strategy for one stubborn 
agent.  We let step 0 represent the initial state of the network with an initial strategy established 
for one stubborn agent.  The game begins at step 1, whereby the opposing stubborn agent 
54 
 
analyzes the initial network from step 0 and subsequently chooses his best strategy based on this 
information.  Figure 3.4 below shows an example network with the initial strategy for the TB 
agent set during step 0 and the first strategy chosen by the US agent during step 1 in order to 
maximize his payoff given the TB agent’s initial strategy from step 0. 
  
Figure 3.4 – Step 0 (Initial Strategy) and Step 1 (First Strategy) Example 
 
3.3.2.7 Penalty for Identical Strategy (λ) 
We enforce a ‘penalty’ for a stubborn agent who connects to a mutable agent who is also 
currently connected to the opposing stubborn agent.  The motivation behind implementing this λ 
penalty factor is two-fold.  First, in a realistic setting, if a person is talking to (and previously 
succumbing to pressure from) an influential person such as a stubborn agent, then another 
influential person of opposite belief trying to subsequently persuade that same person toward his 
own belief will have a more difficult time persuading such a person.  Thus, it is realistic to 
implement a penalty on the stubborn agent in situations such as these in order to mimic reality, 
and therefore, decrease that stubborn agent’s effectiveness.  Second, in Iraq or Afghanistan, it is 
important for leaders to gain steady support over time for the U.S. cause, while staying away 
from high risk strategies that can be extremely variable.  Because instances where a US and TB 
stubborn agent connect to the same agent result in higher variances in terms of network beliefs, 
the US would most likely prefer to stay away from such strategies. 
 For instance, if the US agent,    , connects to a mutable agent who is currently a strategy 
connection for the TB agent,    , then there is a penalty inflicted which impacts the alpha and 
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gamma matrices only whenever     is selected for a pairwise interaction.  In essence, this 
penalty decreases the probability that the penalized stubborn agent (    in this case) will be able 
to forcefully influence the agent who is also being influenced by the TB agent.  Thus, the penalty 
for an identical strategy (λ) will disincentivize stubborn agents from choosing to communicate 
with agents in the network who are currently engaging in conversations with the opposing 
stubborn agent.  The non-penalized and penalized matrices containing the          and     values 
corresponding to the level of influence for the two interacting agents in a realistic Pashtun 
(default) society can be seen in Figure 3.5 below.  Note that the λ penalty can only decrease the 
probability of the penalized stubborn agent engaging in alpha (forceful) interactions and 
subsequently can only increase the probability of engaging in gamma (identity) interactions.  The 
probability of a beta (averaging) interaction remains the same. 
Non-penalized (default) matrices 
                 alpha matrix            beta matrix                gamma matrix 
                               
                                      
    
    
     
    
   
    
    
      
    
                          
    
        
        
    
                           
    
        
        
    
  
Penalized (default) matrices 
                 alpha matrix            beta matrix                gamma matrix 
               
    
    
      
    
                           
    
        
        
    
                     
    
        
        
          
  
 
Where λ       .  The lower λ is, the higher the imposed penalty. 
For example,                               and                         . 
 
Figure 3.5 – Non-penalized and Penalized α, β, and γ Matrices 
     The similar topic of introducing a ‘penalty’ to try to prevent identical strategies for 
stubborn agents was presented in Chapter 4 of Howard’s thesis [13].  He proposed a new payoff 
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function called ‘risk averse mean belief’ which was an attempt to prevent pure Nash equilibrium 
strategy profiles with identical strategies for both players.  The ‘risk averse mean belief’ payoff 
function,           , depends on both the predicted standard deviation and the equilibrium 
mean belief seen below: 
                                                           
                             
                         
The penalty parameter (λ) is set to a positive value (for instance, 1).  Although this 
alternative ‘penalty’ implementation may be useful for some situtations, there are a couple 
problems which limit its usefulness for the transient-threshold, two-player game.  First, the 
predicted standard deviation is in the form of a bound (not an actual number), but more 
importantly, the standard deviation is for the mean, long run equilbirium belief of the network 
for the non-threshold model.  Thus, in order to use a similar approach, we obtain the standard 
deviation of the network beliefs through the use of simulations.  Overall, our penalty 
implementation appears to not only be simpler to implement, but also more easily understood 
from the intuitive sense of using the penalty to affect the likelihood of the types of interactions 
and thus indirectly affecting the payoffs, rather than directly affecting the payoffs.  
3.3.3 Payoff Function 
 The last input for the game is selecting the payoff function for each stubborn agent.  The 
goal of each stubborn agent is to select a set of strategy connections throughout the game which 
will allow them to maximally influence the mutable agents in the network.  However, the notion 
of what ‘maximal influence’ is could depend on the specific payoff function selected by the 
stubborn agents.  Below we introduced two different payoffs for the two-player game—Mean 
Belief and Number of Agents (Nodes) Won.   
Mean Belief 
 If the ‘mean belief’ payoff function is selected, each player will maximally influence the 
network by selecting the mutable agents as strategies which will move the mean belief of all 
mutable agents in the network toward their side.  For example, if the US agent has higher 
57 
 
influence in the network compared to the TB agent, then the mean belief of the mutable agents in 
the network will move towards +0.5.  In the reverse case, if the strategies chosen by the TB agent 
are more influential than those chosen by the US agent, then the mean belief of the mutable 
agents will move towards -0.5.  Thus, the US agent wants the mean belief of the network to be as 
high as possible (close to +0.5), while the TB agent wants the network mean belief to be a low as 
possible (close to -0.5).  
 The ‘mean belief’ payoff function, denoted     , is defined as: 
                   
 
    
                          
    
   
 (3.13)  
Number of Agents (Nodes) Won 
 If the ‘number of agents (nodes) won’ payoff function is chosen, each player will 
maximally influence the network by choosing the mutable agents as strategies which will yield 
the highest number of mutable agents toward supporting their side.  Each player is awarded 1 
point for every mutable agent who is deemed to be in support of their side.  A mutable agent is 
deemed to be in support of a player’s side if their belief is above/below a predetermined buffer 
threshold (B), where B         .  We present the point system for the Number of Agents Won 
payoff function below in Table 3.2. 
US Points Awarded Mutable Agent Belief TB Points Awarded 
+1 > B -1 
0 [-B,B] 0 
-1 < -B +1 
Table 3.2 – Number of Agents Won Point System 
 For instance, if B     , then the US and TB agents are awarded +1 and -1 points, 
respectively, for all mutable agents with beliefs above +0.1.  Subsequently, the TB and US 
agents are awarded +1 and -1 points, respectively, for all mutable agents with beliefs below -0.1.  
No points are awarded to either player for indecisive mutable agents with beliefs between [-0.1, 
+0.1].  Thus, we see that the range of possible discrete values for this payoff function is on the 
interval             , while the range of possible continuous values for the ‘mean belief’ payoff 
is on the interval           . 
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 More specifically, the ‘number of agents (nodes) won’ payoff function, denoted     , is 
defined as: 
       
        
            
         
  (3.14)  
 
       
        
            
         
  (3.15)  
 
                            
    
   
               (3.16)  
     Note:                                         
Zero Sum vs. Non-Zero Sum Games 
 If both players choose the same payoff function, either                   or 
                 , then both players are playing a zero sum game.  A zero sum game occurs 
whenever the payoff for one player is exactly the opposite payoff for the other player.  We call 
these games zero sum games because summing up both players payoffs at any particular time 
during the game will result in the summation equaling zero: 
                                               
                                               
 However, any combination of different payoff functions will not result in a zero sum 
game.  Therefore, different combinations of              , such as                  , result in 
non-zero sum games. 
Absolute Payoff vs. Relative Payoff 
There are two ways we can report the payoffs for each player—(1) the true absolute value 
of the payoff which is directly calculated by each payoff function, or (2) the relative value which 
takes into account the initial starting conditions of the network.  The reason we are interested in 
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knowing the relative payoff, besides solely the absolute payoff, is to gauge how much the payoff 
for each player has changed relative to the initial payoff.  The relative payoff allows us to better 
analyze the progress a player has made, which can sometimes be unapparent when strictly 
viewing the absolute payoff.  We emphasis this point through the use of the following example 
shown below in Figure 3.6: 
     Initial Network Beliefs                     End Game Network Beliefs 
          Mean Belief = -0.5                                        Mean Belief = -0.3832 
 
Payoff Chart 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Absolute Payoff vs. Relative Payoff Example 
In the above example, both players used the ‘mean belief’ payoff,     , and a total of 6 
steps occurred during the game (3 for each player, starting with step 1 for the US agent) with 100 
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pairwise interactions per step.  The initial mean belief of the network was -0.5, meaning that all 
mutable agents very strongly favored the Taliban.  The absolute ‘mean belief’ payoff at the end 
of the game with respective to the US agent is -0.3832, which means the average belief of the 
mutable agents in the network is still strongly in favor of the Taliban.  Therefore, from the 
absolute perspective of the network beliefs, the Taliban agent won the game.  However, the 
relative ‘mean belief’ payoff at the end of the game with respect to the US agent is +0.1168, 
which indicates that the US agent won the game from the relative perspective since on average, 
each mutable agent in the network moved +0.1168 in their mean belief toward the US side from 
the start of the game.  Thus, we see that both payoff measures (absolute and relative) are 
necessary since they serve different purposes for how we can interpret the outcome of the game. 
Strategy Profile and Payoff Table 
Finally, we show an example strategy profile and payoff table below (Table 3.3), which 
illustrates the progression of the two-player, dynamic game over 4 steps based on the initial 
network shown in Figure 3.4.  Because there are 4 steps in this example game, each player is 
given 2 steps (opportunities) to update their strategies, where step 0 does not count.  The initial 
step, step 0, is the initial connection strategy {2} of the TB stubborn agent which is used to 
initiate the start of the game.  The payoff used for both players is the mean belief payoff from 
(3.13).  Because the initial mean belief of the network is 0, the relative payoff is identical to the 
absolute payoff. 
 Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
Initial TB Strategy (no US 
Strategy) 
0 2 -- 0.0000 0.0000 
1st US step (TB Strategy 
Fixed from Step 0) 
1 2 7 0.0156 0.0156 
1st TB step (US Strategy 
Fixed from Step 1) 
2 12 7 0.0045 0.0045 
2nd US step (TB Strategy 
Fixed from Step 2) 
3 12 2 -0.0056 -0.0056 
2nd TB step (US Strategy 
Fixed from Step 3) 
4 7 2 -0.0342 -0.0342 
Table 3.3 – Example Strategy Profile and Payoff Table 
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3.3.4 Finding Strategies to Improve Payoff 
Lastly, we describe the approach both players take in locating strategies to improve their 
payoffs during the game.  Due to the nature of the game, whereby both players know the other 
player’s strategy, the network topology (meaning the influence level of all agents and their 
connections), and the beliefs of all agents throughout the entirety of the game, no player has an 
advantage from an intelligence viewpoint when selecting their strategies.  However, given all 
this information, the task of determining which agent(s) to choose as strategies at any particular 
time during the game can be quite overwhelming.  Below we discuss the strategy space which is 
searched by the players in order to select strategies to improve their payoff, and later, we propose 
heuristics which drastically reduce the time it takes to find solutions.  As the complexity of the 
network and two-player game increases, we find that the use of heuristics are necessary as the 
computational times become too burdensome. 
3.3.4.1 Players and Strategies 
In the two-player game there are two opposing stubborn agents of opposite, immutable 
beliefs (refer to the belief spectrum shown earlier in Figure 3.1).  The United States (US) agent 
has a belief of +0.5, while the Taliban (TB) agent has a belief of -0.5.  The objective of the game 
for each stubborn agent is to select mutable agents to communicate with in order to maximally 
spread their influence (belief) throughout the network.  We measure a stubborn agent’s success 
in the game by determining their specific payoff, which will be discussed in a later section. 
Although there is only one stubborn agent per side in this two-player game, each 
stubborn agent has     connections to mutable agents in the network.  Each stubborn agent 
will have the same number of connections they will be allowed to make during the game.  Thus, 
if    , for example, the US agent and TB agent will each have three connections they can 
make to mutable agents in the network throughout the course of the game.  We will refer to these 
connections as strategies, and they represent communication links between the targeted mutable 
agents in the network and the stubborn agent.  We use the following notion: 
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The number of possible strategies is on the order of      
 , but more precisely, the set is 
determined by using a combination with repetition because (1) we do not care about order (i.e. 
the strategy {1, 2} is the same as the strategy {2, 1}), and (2) we allow repetition of strategies 
(i.e. the strategy {1, 1} is allowed).  We allow repetition of the same targeted agent in strategies 
in order to mimic the possibility for a stubborn agent wishing to place more of his time and effort 
on a particular agent, rather than spreading his efforts to multiple agents.  Also, although we 
mention in our assumptions that we only consider a static network concerning the number of 
agents (nodes), we prefer the notation      instead of simply,  , to describe the set of all 
strategies during the game in order to allow the possibility of future work dealing with dynamic, 
evolving networks in which the list of possible strategies changes over time.   
For instance, in the example network diagram (see Figure 3.2), given we know    , 
then we get the following: 
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Throughout the course of the game, each stubborn agent will be given opportunities in 
which they may update (change) their current connection strategy to a more favorable strategy.  
In this sense, we view the two-player game as a dynamic “chess game” such that the stubborn 
agents will constantly reevaluate their current strategy (position) during the game in relation to 
their opponent’s strategy and then make subsequent strategy changes based on these evaluations.  
However, we view the game as a perfect information game, such that during all times of the 
game, each stubborn agent knows the opposing stubborn agent’s strategy.  We leave the notion 
of imperfect information games, whereby stubborn agents are unsure of the exact strategies of 
their opponent, for future work. 
3.3.4.2 Exhaustive Enumeration 
Locating strategies through the use of exhaustive enumeration means we calculate all 
possible strategies available to a player and choose the strategy which yields the highest payoff.  
The clear advantage of using exhaustive enumeration is the guarantee that the best empirical 
strategies will be found because we have searched the entire strategy space.  However, due to the 
size of the strategy space, which can exponentially increase with the number of connections each 
player makes, the time it takes to locate such strategies can become quite cumbersome.  
Circumstances involving very large networks with multiple connections per stubborn agent 
present an obvious tradeoff scenario for the players between the degree of optimality they are 
willing to accept and the run time needed for evaluating the best strategies.  Therefore, we must 
explore additional measures each player can take in order to significantly reduce simulation run 
times without significantly jeopardizing the quality of the chosen strategies.  
3.3.4.3 ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic 
Heuristics are “problem-solving methods which tend to produce efficient solutions to 
difficult problems by restricting the search through the space of possible solutions” [20].   
Similar to the way humans utilize heuristics in order to keep the information processing demands 
of a task within the bounds of limited cognitive capacity [21], we also implement heuristics in 
order to decrease the size of the strategy space that is searched.  A simple method a player can 
implement in order to decrease the time necessary to evaluate the best available strategy is by 
first determining which strategies are consistently observed as being empirically suboptimal in 
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comparison to other available strategies.  If a player can determine what characteristics 
inherently make a strategy worse than other strategies, then a heuristic can be used by the player 
during the game which reduces the strategy space that is searched by not including strategies 
which are deemed suboptimal.  Due to the presence of more influential agents in the network, 
both Hung and Howard repeatedly found that ‘regular’ agents were very rarely selected as 
strategies.  Only in networks strictly dominated by regular agents and lacking agents of higher 
influence level did regular agents become chosen strategies.  Thus, because regular agents are the 
least influential agents in the networks, connecting to them does not typically maximize a 
player’s payoff because regular agents do not have the ability to forcefully influence other 
agents. 
Similar to our predecessors, we also find that players in the two-player game on the 
threshold model rarely choose regular agents as strategies to maximize their payoffs, given the 
presence of agents who are more influential in the network.  Only very special network 
structures, which do not necessarily mimic a realistic society, do we find cases involving regular 
agents being selected as strategies.  Figure 3.7 shows a line graph example where a regular agent 
is chosen as a strategy by the U.S. agent.   
 
Figure 3.7 – Line Graph Example with Regular Agent Chosen as Strategy 
Based on the consistent observation that regular agents are rarely chosen as strategies by the 
players, we implement the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic for both players in order to reduce the 
computational time needed to find strategies to improve a player’s payoff. 
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Description 
 The ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic removes all strategy combinations involving at least one 
regular agent from the list of possible strategies in the strategy space, and subsequently uses 
exhaustive enumeration on the remaining strategies (all combinations with repetition involving 
only forceful and/or forceful+ agents) to determine the best available strategy for a player.  Thus, 
this heuristic is designed to exhaustively enumerate only a subset of the entire strategy space 
since it removes all strategies containing regular agents.  Although using the ‘Selective Search’ 
Heuristic removes the guarantee of finding the best empirical solutions when compared to using 
exhaustive enumeration, we find that the strategies found by the heuristic almost exclusively 
match the strategies found using exhaustive enumeration, with the few exceptions involving 
special network cases. 
DEFINTION: 
 The ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic reduces the size of the strategy space at time  ,       , 
from                 
 
  under exhaustive enumeration to                      
 
 .  
Example 
 In order to better illustrate the power of this simple, yet quite effective heuristic, we 
return to an example involving the network shown in Figure 3.2.  Table 3.4 below lists all 
possible strategies that are searched using both exhaustive enumeration and the ‘Selective 
Search’ Heuristic, given each player only has one connection (   ).  As we see, the simple 
heuristic is able to reduce the entire strategy space from 16 to 4 strategies since the network 
contains 12 regular agents {3-6, 8-11, 13-16}, 3 forceful agents {2, 7, 12}, and 1 forceful+ agent 
{1}. 
 
Exhaustive Enumeration Selective Search 
Strategy 
Space: 
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16} 
{1, 2, 7, 12} 
 
Table 3.4 – Strategy Space Comparison: Exhaustive Enumeration vs. ‘Selective Search’ 
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More importantly, for scenarios in which we have multiple connections per stubborn 
agent (   ), the strategy space can be exponentially reduced depending on the number of 
regular agents which are in the network.  For example, using the same network in Figure 3.2, if 
both players are allowed two connections (     then the size of the strategy space is reduced 
from                 
 
         
 
      (exhaustive enumeration) to              
 
     
(‘Selective Search’).  Thus, we see how powerful this heuristic can be at significantly reducing 
the run time by reducing the size of the strategy space. 
3.3.4.4 ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm 
The ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic offers us one way to significantly reduce the size of the 
strategy space, of which the degree in reduction depends on the number of regular agents in the 
network.  However, for large networks with many influential agents in which each stubborn 
agent has multiple connections, the run time can still be quite burdensome, even after removing 
all combinations of regular agents from the strategy space.  Thus, we implement another 
heuristic ‘Sequential Search’ which is a greedy algorithm specifically designed for reducing the 
run time for cases involving     connections per stubborn agent.  The use of a greedy 
algorithm to improve the computational time for finding strategies which maximize belief 
propagation in social networks has been previously proposed by Kempe et al. [22], and we 
similarly propose the use of a greedy algorithm for selecting strategies for complex network 
problems. 
Description 
 The ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm further reduces the size of the strategy space 
after the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic only if the number of connections per player (stubborn 
agent) is greater than one (   ).  The idea behind this greedy approach is to solve the best 
connections for a player ‘sequentially’ rather than simultaneously.  In other words, the greedy 
algorithm implements the idea of finding and adding the single best connection (one at a time) to 
the strategy profile for a player that yields the maximum marginal return to the player’s payoff 
function.  Thus, rather than simultaneously searching all available combinations of size ‘z’, we 
find the best available connection one at a time until the entire strategy profile is of length ‘z’. 
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DEFINITION: 
The ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm reduces the size of the strategy space at time   
from                      
 
  under ‘Selective Search’ to                    .  If    , 
the two strategy spaces become equivalent. 
Greedy Algorithm Summary 
Below we detail the steps performed by the greedy algorithm, ‘Sequential Search’: 
 Given          at time     and        at time   
 Given payoff function for each player:                  } 
 The player which updates their strategy at step k and time   is designated as:   
        
 The opposing player which maintains a fixed strategy when player P is updating their 
strategy is designated as: F          
 
1.           ,               ,                
2. WHILE           < z 
3. Given      ,the opposing player’s strategy,      , which is fixed and of magnitude 
‘z’, and the strategy space,     , find the single best connection strategy,          , 
which yields the highest payoff for player P after time     
4.                          
5.               ,                
6. END 
Example 
In order to get a better understanding of the ability of this greedy algorithm to reduce the 
strategy space that is searched, we explore the following example.  Figure 3.8 shows a 73 node 
network (excluding the two players), of which there are 35 agents who have either a forceful+ or 
forceful level of influence (i.e.             .  We assume each player is allowed     
strategy connections.  Thus, once the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic is used, the size of the strategy 
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space is reduced from                 
 
         
 
         to               
 
       .  
Although we have considerably reduced the size of the strategy space through the ‘Selective 
Search’ Heuristic, exhaustively searching all 7,770 different strategies during each realization of 
the Monte Carlo simulation still presents a sizeable run time problem. 
 
Figure 3.8 – Example 73 Agent Network 
However, upon using the greedy algorithm, after first reducing the strategy space through 
the use of the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic, we are able to further reduce the strategy space from: 
        
             
 
   
      
 
        
To 
                                
We provide further detail below on how a player uses the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy 
Algorithm during the two-player game to significantly reduce the size of the strategy space that 
is searched during a given step k of the game. 
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This example shows how efficient the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm can be at 
significantly reducing the strategy space for cases where    .  For cases where    , we see 
that no further reductions in the strategy space are made by the greedy algorithm.  One pertinent 
question that needs answering in relation to the greedy algorithm is how the potentially drastic 
reduction in strategy space affects the quality of the solutions in comparison to exhaustive 
enumeration.  Such quality consequences of the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm will be 
analyzed in Chapter 4. 
3.4 The Necessity of Simulations in Calculating Belief Propagation 
The previous social influence network models used by Hung [8] and Howard [13] have 
one clear advantage over our proposed threshold model—the existence of an analytic expression 
for calculating the long-term expected beliefs of the agents in the network.  Due to the nature of 
the threshold model, in which the diffusion of beliefs depends on the current beliefs of the agents 
at every interaction, an analytic expression which calculates the expected belief of the network 
    interactions into the future has not been found to exist.  Thus, we must employ the use of 
Monte Carlo simulations in order to achieve a reasonable understanding of the behavior of the 
threshold model. 
3.5 Modeling Formulation Summary 
In this chapter, we described the formulation of a proposed threshold model which is a 
stochastic, pairwise-interaction model with mutable agents whose beliefs can change and with 
immutable (stubborn) agents whose beliefs do not change.  The purpose of this formulation was 
to incorporate more realistic assumptions in previously proposed models [8,13] such as: 
1. The long-term beliefs of the mutable agents in the network should be dependent 
on the initial beliefs of those mutable agents, despite the presence of immutable 
stubborn agents. 
2. Introduce a dynamic, two-player game whereby each player controls a 
predetermined number of connections to mutable agents in the network, and the 
objective of the game for each player is to maximize their respective payoff 
function. 
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3. We shifted the previous focus from analyzing the long-term asymptotic 
equilibrium behavior of the network to instead analyzing the transient behavior of 
the network during the course of the two-player game.  We will see in Chapter 4 
that both players continually evaluate, change, and reevaluate their strategies 
throughout the course of the game, while not being content on settling on identical 
Nash Equilibria strategies for the long-run. 
4. Peer pressure should affect the outcome of belief exchanges during pairwise 
interactions. 
5. Lastly, we implemented the ability to penalize the payoffs for identical strategies 
among opposing stubborn agents (U.S. and Taliban) in order to disincentivize 
their appeal during the two-player game, which thus creates a more realistic 
setting for the game. 
Furthermore, we defined how the players locate strategies during the game and 
introduced two heuristic methods, the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic and the ‘Sequential Search’ 
Greedy Algorithm which are used to significantly reduce the run time needed to find solutions 
for complex problems where the use of exhaustive enumeration becomes too cumbersome.  In 
the next chapter, we explore the characteristics of the strategies chosen by the players and 
discuss experimental results designed to better understand the properties of the threshold model 
under the two-player game. 
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4 Experiments and Analysis 
This chapter discusses the results of simulation experiments aimed at understanding the 
dynamics of the two-player game.  The first set of experiments in Section 4.1 details the general 
characteristics of the strategies chosen by the players to maximize their payoffs in the transient 
setting.  Next, we present experiments which analyze how different payoff functions influence 
the strategies that are chosen by the players followed by sensitivity analyses of additional model 
parameters.  In Section 4.2 we examine the run time performance and compare the strategies and 
payoffs found by exhaustive enumeration, ‘Selective Search’, and ‘Sequential Search’.  Lastly, in 
Section 4.3 we introduce population-focused actions—stimulus projects and assassinations—
which are available for use during the two-player game by the US agent and TB agent, 
respectively, in order further aid in spreading their influence throughout the network. 
Experimental Scope 
 We remind the reader that all observations and conclusions drawn from the following 
experiments are based off of extensive empirical evidence obtained through the use of Monte 
Carlo simulations.  While lacking formal theoretical proof, we do find some very interesting 
results from the simulations concerning the characteristics of the strategies that are chosen by the 
players, and we provide the intuitive reasons which help explain why we observe such results.  
Experimental Parameters 
 In Chapter 3 we described the various parameters for the threshold model, which are used 
for the two-player game.  During the experiments presented in this chapter, unless otherwise 
stated, we used the following default experimental parameters found in Table 4.1 below.  Also, 
recall the following set notation defined in Chapter 3: 
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Threshold (  ) Values:     
         
              
       
  
Interaction-type Probabilities 
(     ): 
     
                                
                                     
    
    
     
    
   
    
    
      
    
  
     
                                
                                     
    
    
     
    
   
    
        
        
    
  
     
                                
                                     
    
    
     
    
   
    
        
        
    
  
Penalty for Identical Strategy ( ):     (maximum penalty imposed) 
Standard Deviation of the Number 
of Interactions per Step ( ): 
    
Table 4.1 – Default Experimental Parameters     
 
Experimental Setup 
All experiments were performed on a Dell Studio 1558 with an Intel ® Core™ i3-350M 
Dual-Core processor running at 2.27 GHz. The laptop has 4 GB of RAM, and runs 64-bit 
Windows 7 Home Premium. All of our code is written and run in 64-bit MATLAB version 
7.11.0.584. 
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4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Characteristics of Strategies 
The purpose of this set of experiments is to (1) show the general characteristics of the 
strategies chosen by the stubborn agents in the two-player game and (2) provide the intuitive 
reasoning why such strategies are targeted by the stubborn agents.  For these experiments, we 
exhaustively enumerate the payoffs for every strategy to ensure the best strategies are chosen 
only after examining the payoffs from the entire strategy space and not a subset which would 
decreases our confidence in the quality of the chosen strategies.  Although we limit ourselves to 
one connection per stubborn agent (   ) for the examples in this experiment set, since the 
computational time for exhaustive enumeration can become very slow for multiple connections 
per stubborn agent, we do compare the results of multiple connection scenarios between the two 
heuristic methods and exhaustive enumeration in Section 4.2. 
Table 4.2 below shows the experimental design parameters used for all experiments in 
this experiment set in which we conduct the two-player game in the transient setting on the 
threshold model. 
Experiment Set Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 10 
Interactions per Step 300 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [70] 
Table 4.2 – Characteristics of Strategies: Experiment Set Description 
We tested the large, 73 agent Pashtun network created through the use of Hung’s network 
generator tool with 9 different initial starting beliefs for the mutable agents in the network.  The 
network diagrams for these 9 cases are seen below in Figure 4.1.  For further detail on the initial 
beliefs of all agents in these networks refer to Appendix B.  Throughout the remainder of this 
chapter we will refer to these network configurations in various experiments by the titles shown 
in Figure 4.1 to identify the initial beliefs of the agents in the networks. 
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   9.  All Random 
 
Figure 4.1 – Experimental Network Diagrams 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the strategies targeted by the stubborn agents in the models 
used by both Hung and Howard were independent of the beliefs of the mutable agents in the 
network.    The proposed threshold model and two-player game incorporated assumptions aimed 
at formulating a more realistic model, such as:  
1. The long-term beliefs of the mutable agents in the network should be dependent 
on the initial beliefs of those mutable agents, despite the presence of immutable 
stubborn agents. 
2. We shifted the previous focus from analyzing the long-term asymptotic 
equilibrium behavior of the network to instead analyzing the transient behavior of 
the network during the course of the two-player game.   
3. Introduce a dynamic, two-player game whereby both players continually evaluate, 
change, and reevaluate their strategies throughout the course of the game, while 
not being content on settling on identical Nash Equilibria strategies for the long-
run. 
4. Peer pressure should affect the outcome of belief exchanges during pairwise 
interactions. 
5. Lastly, we implemented the ability to penalize the payoffs for identical strategies 
among opposing stubborn agents (U.S. and Taliban) in order to disincentivize 
their appeal during the two-player game, which thus creates a more realistic 
setting for the game. 
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We first compare the strategies chosen by Howard’s stubborn agents during the two-
player game on his network model with the strategies chosen by the stubborn agents on the 
proposed threshold model.  The results are presented for all 9 test cases.  Table 4.3 below shows 
the strategies and ‘mean belief’ payoffs for the TB and US agents for the 9 network diagrams 
shown in Figure 4.1 using Howard’s simulated annealing heuristic to find the Nash equilibria, 
long-term strategies for the two-player game.  Note that regardless of initial starting conditions 
(beliefs), both stubborn agents choose fixed, identical strategies (agent 70) to connect to during 
the entire game.  Also, the ‘mean belief’ payoff of the network is 0 in all cases, as the long-term, 
expected equilibrium beliefs of the network are independent of initial beliefs, but rather 
determined by the beliefs of the stubborn agents, the chosen connection strategies, and the 
topology of the network. 
  
Strategy Profile and Payoff Table 
Long-Term (1012) Interactions 
 
Starting Beliefs TB Strategy US Strategy Mean Belief Payoff 
Experiment 1: All Neutral 70 70 0 
Experiment 2: Village Mix 0 70 70 0 
Experiment 3: Village Mix 1 70 70 0 
Experiment 4: Village Mix 2 70 70 0 
Experiment 5: Village Mix 3 70 70 0 
Experiment 6: Village Mix 4 70 70 0 
Experiment 7: Village Mix 5 70 70 0 
Experiment 8: Village Mix 6 70 70 0 
Experiment 9: All Random 70 70 0 
Table 4.3 – Characteristics of Strategies: Strategy Profile and Payoff Table Using Howard’s 
Model 
 By comparison, the same 9 experiments for the dynamic, two-player game on the 
threshold model in the transient setting yield quite different results.  The strategy profile and 
payoff tables for experiments 5 and 6 are shown in Table 4.4.  Appendix B shows the strategy 
profile and payoff tables for all 9 experiments. 
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Experiment 5      Experiment 6
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 31 -0.0065 0.0017  1 70 23 -0.0135 0.0015 
2 48 31 -0.0025 0.0058  2 48 23 -0.0174 -0.0023 
3 48 39 0.0074 0.0156  3 48 21 -0.0041 0.0110 
4 49 39 0.0068 0.0150  4 49 21 -0.0113 0.0038 
5 49 40 0.0155 0.0237  5 49 48 -0.0062 0.0089 
6 39 40 0.0151 0.0233  6 13 48 -0.0059 0.0091 
7 39 23 0.0214 0.0296  7 13 49 0.0019 0.0169 
8 12 23 0.0199 0.0281  8 12 49 -0.0011 0.0140 
9 12 39 0.0269 0.0351  9 12 13 0.0065 0.0216 
10 13 39 0.0221 0.0304  10 49 13 0.0048 0.0199 
Table 4.4 – Characteristics of Strategies: Experiments 5 and 6 Strategy Profile and Payoff 
Tables Using the Proposed Threshold Model 
 
In all 9 cases, the strategy profile and payoff tables show that not only do the initial 
beliefs dictate the strategies chosen during each step of the game, but the ending ‘mean belief’ 
payoff of the network is dependent upon the initial starting beliefs as well.  Although the 
experiments conducted on the proposed threshold model focus on the transient behavior of the 
network, the asymptotic equilibrium state of the network is also dependent on the initial beliefs 
of the agents in the network.  Not only do the beliefs of the mutable agents in the threshold 
network dictate the equilibrium state of the network due to peer pressure influencing changes in 
beliefs, but we find that the beliefs of the mutable agents also influence the strategy decisions of 
the stubborn agents. 
KEY OBSERVATIONS 
We present four key observations below concerning the strategies that are chosen to 
improve a stubborn agent’s payoff during the dynamic, two-player game for the threshold model 
in the transient setting.  As previously discussed in Chapter 3, we use Monte Carlo simulations to 
observe the propagation of beliefs in the social network during the two-player game.  The 
observations presented below are thus based on empirical evidence obtained through Monte 
Carlo simulation experiments and are not obtained through the use of theoretical proofs.  
Furthermore, these findings are consistently observed among various different network 
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scenarios; however, for simplicity we limit ourselves to the same network example when 
presenting these observations.   
OBSERVATION #1:  Stubborn agents should target influential agents of opposite belief. 
 We illustrate the point made in observation #1 by viewing the strategy profile for 
experiment 5 found in Table 4.3.  During step 1 of the game the U.S. agent chooses agent 31, 
who is a forceful agent with an initial belief of -0.3.  There are no other influential agents of 
lesser initial belief.  Thus, the U.S. strategy makes sense intuitively because a stubborn agent has 
more potential to improve his payoff by selecting agents who hold opinions opposite their own in 
an attempt to persuade them to change their belief toward their own side.  A stubborn agent 
stands little to gain by selecting agents as strategies who are already in favor of their opinion.  
Although we mention the characteristic for stubborn agents to choose strategies that are of 
opposite belief, we find that choosing strategies is far more complex than simply finding the 
most influential leader of opposite belief from the stubborn agent. 
OBSERVATION #2:  Stubborn agents should target influential agents who have many 
neighbors (large     ) of lesser influence level, and whose neighbors live in small neighborhoods 
(small     ). 
 Influential agents who have the qualities discussed in observation #2, who have opposite 
belief from the stubborn agent (observation #1), and who additionally have neighbors who are 
also of opposite belief, tend to be the most beneficial strategies for stubborn agents.  The 
intuitive reason why influential leaders whose neighbors have small neighborhoods (where an 
agent’s neighborhood is defined as the number of adjacency connections they have) are chosen 
strategies is that small neighborhoods means the neighbors of the targeted agent are as isolated as 
possible from other agents in the network which helps to prevent outside influence from 
affecting them.  Thus, this maximizes the probability that the stubborn agent’s influence will 
diffuse throughout the entire neighborhood or village of the targeted agent unhindered by outside 
influence.  Empirical evidence also suggests that stubborn agents target agents whose 
neighborhoods are also dominated by opinions which are in opposition to the stubborn agent.  
Studies have shown that people who are faced with opinions contrary to their own belief will 
often shift their opinions in the “direction of the views of the majorities or the experts” [23].  
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Subsequently, the effect that group pressure can have on individuals to conform to the belief held 
by the majority of their neighbors may hint at the notion that people living in the same village or 
vicinity often have the same or similar beliefs. 
 A convincing example of observation #2 is found by looking at experiment 5 (network 
shown below).  The Taliban agent initially has a starting connection to agent 70 at step 0, and the 
U.S. agent is given the first opportunity to select its best strategy given this information.  Thus, 
agent 31 is selected by the U.S. agent as its first strategy (see Figure 4.2).  There are a couple 
reasons why agent 31 was targeted by the U.S. agent.  First, agent 31 and his neighbors all have 
strongly negative (anti-U.S.) beliefs (-0.3).  Second, out of the three villages which have strongly 
negative beliefs, the village containing agent 31 has the smallest neighborhoods—which means 
less influence from other influential agents who are neighbors to agent 31’s neighbors will be 
able to affect the beliefs of the neighbors of agent 31. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Experiment 5: First Chosen U.S. Strategy 
Next, upon the conclusion of step 1, where the US agent selects agent 31, the TB agent 
updates his strategy (previously agent 70) at step 2 given the US agent is now connected to agent 
31.  Using the same logic, the TB agent determines that agent 48 is the best strategy (see Figure 
4.3 below) due to—(1) agent 48 is the most influential leader with direct access to regular agents 
in that village, (2) all the agents in the village are strongly pro-US (anti-TB) with beliefs +0.3, 
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and (3) agent 48 lives in an isolated village—the village neighbors of agent 48 have small 
neighborhoods, and thus, outside influence from more power agents is minimal in the transient 
state compared to the other pro-US villages.  We next discuss a consistent observation 
concerning strategies involving villages which contain more than one influential leader. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Experiment 5: First Chosen Taliban Strategy 
OBSERVATION #3:  The targeting strategy for villages containing more than one influential 
leader of similar belief is for stubborn agents to sequentially target some, or all, of those village 
leaders. 
 The intuitive reason behind observation #3 is (1) the targeted village most likely has 
agents of homogenous beliefs which are in opposition to the stubborn agent, which means that 
(2) the stubborn agent must target multiple village leaders in order to gradually influence the 
beliefs of all members in the village.  Simply targeting one influential leader within a village 
containing multiple leaders is typically not observed because the targeted agent will quickly 
succumb to the peer pressure of the other village leaders upon the withdrawal of the stubborn 
agent’s influence on the targeted agent.  Thus, due to the peer pressure effect of the threshold 
model, which affects how easily agents are persuaded to change their beliefs, a stubborn agent 
must sequentially target leaders within the same village in order to gradually change the beliefs 
of the entire village.   
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 We demonstrate the principle of observation #3 by continuing with the same example 
(experiment 5).  We previously saw that the TB agent targeted agent 48 as his first strategy.  
Upon his next step, the TB agent selects agent 49, which is a forceful leader located in the same 
village as agent 48.  We see the dramatic effect this sequential targeting technique can have on 
the beliefs in a village when we compare Figures 4.3 and 4.4, and later, 4.5 and 4.6.  Once a 
stubborn agent is able to influence the beliefs of the influential leaders in a village, it becomes 
easier for the rest of the agents of lesser influence level (regulars) in the village to be influenced 
since the influential agents in a village have a higher probability of spreading their beliefs to the 
agents of lower level of influence in that village.   
 
Figure 4.4 – Experiment 5: Before Second Chosen Taliban Strategy 
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Figure 4.5 – Experiment 5: After Second Chosen Taliban Strategy 
The resulting network below (Figure 4.6) shows the beliefs of the agents in the network 
at the conclusion of the 10-step, 3000 pairwise interaction game.  Note that the presence of peer 
pressure in the threshold model impacts the diffusion of beliefs in the network, such that even 
after 3000 interactions the initial beliefs of the agents are still recognizable—i.e. the initial 
beliefs of the agents in the network affect the end state beliefs.  The presence of the threshold 
model, and the ability it has to affect belief propagation through peer pressure influence, has 
significantly changed the behavior of the stubborn agents in choosing strategies during the two-
player game when viewed in the transient setting compared to our predecessors’ models. 
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Figure 4.6 – Experiment 5: End Game Network Beliefs 
 During the previous analysis above, we used the default threshold values shown below: 
 
            
                 
          
  
However, we also observe how sensitive the chosen strategies in the two-player game are 
to the specific threshold values of the agents in the network.  In general, we observe that low 
threshold values in the network result in a rapid diffusion of beliefs as stubborn agents wield 
greater influence ability, while high threshold values result in a low diffusion of beliefs as the 
initial beliefs of the agents will prevail.  We illustrate this point by presenting the two extreme 
cases for the threshold values—(1) all mutable agents have threshold values of 0, and (2) all 
mutable agents have threshold values of 1.  In both experiments, we use the same network under 
the same initial beliefs for the agents in the network.  This network is shown as experiment 5 in 
Figure 4.1. 
 In the first experiment, all mutable agents have a threshold value equal to 0: 
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 Figure 4.7 below shows the ending network beliefs using these threshold values for a 10-
step game with 300 interactions per step, and where each stubborn agent has one connection 
(   ).  With the threshold values for all mutable agents set to 0, we observe that the stubborn 
agents are able to more quickly propagate their beliefs through the network, which enables huge 
changes in agent beliefs from their initial values.  The reason why the stubborn agents are able to 
quickly diffuse their beliefs to the mutable agents in the network when all mutable threshold 
values are 0 is that the peer pressure aspect of the threshold model has essentially been ‘turned 
off’ in this case.  Thus, the most influential agents in the network—the two stubborn agents—are 
able to exert the most influence in the network as mutable agents are no longer apprehensive to 
change their beliefs in opposition to their neighbors’ beliefs. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Ending Network Diagram: Mutable Thresholds = 0 Example 
 Next, we compare the results of this first experiment where all mutable threshold values 
are zero with the following experiment on the same network whereby all mutable agents have the 
other extreme threshold value of 1: 
          
 Figure 4.8 is the network diagram which shows the beliefs of the agents at the end of the 
10-step game with 300 interactions per step when all threshold values are 1.  In this extreme 
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case, no change in beliefs from the initial beliefs occurs because each mutable agent has 
effectively become stubborn in their own beliefs and is unwilling to adopt a new belief. 
 
Figure 4.8 – Ending Network Diagram: Mutable Thresholds = 1 Example 
Due to the sensitive nature of the individual threshold values, which can have a tremendous 
impact on the strategies chosen by the stubborn agents, we present the final key observation for 
strategies chosen by the players to maximize their payoffs. 
OBSERVATION #4:  Stubborn agents should target influential agents with low threshold 
values who also have neighbors with low threshold values. 
 We have observed that not only do stubborn agents consider the threshold value of each 
individual when choosing strategies, but also the threshold values of the neighbors of each 
individual.  In other words, the appeal of an agent as a targeted strategy depends not only on the 
agent’s individual threshold value, but also the threshold values of those agents in his 
neighborhood.  We present two examples below which illustrate this observation.  Both 
examples use the experiment 5 network shown in Figure 4.1; however, we slightly modify the 
threshold values of the agents to demonstrate how sensitive the threshold values are in 
determining targeted strategies. 
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 In the first experiment, we assume the following threshold values: 
    
         
                
      
       
  
 Thus, the only difference from the default threshold values is that agent 1, a forceful+ 
leader, has a threshold value that is reduced from 0.75 to 0.5.  The purpose of this experiment is 
to show that players target agents with low threshold values.  Table 4.5 shows the strategy profile 
and payoff table for this experiment.  When we compare the chosen strategies between this table 
and Table 4.3 (the default baseline case), we note that agent 1 is chosen three different times 
(twice by the TB agent and once by the US agent) in Table 4.5 when his threshold value has been 
reduced to 0.5, while agent 1 is not previously chosen as a strategy in the baseline scenario in 
Table 4.3.  Therefore, we have shown that an influential agent with a low threshold value, 
relative to the other influential agents in the network, strengthens his position as a candidate to 
be chosen as a strategy by the players.  
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 31 -0.0065 0.0017 
2 1 31 -0.0046 0.0036 
3 1 39 0.0027 0.0109 
4 48 39 0.0015 0.0097 
5 48 1 0.0140 0.0222 
6 49 1 0.0098 0.0180 
7 49 23 0.0142 0.0225 
8 1 23 0.0069 0.0151 
9 1 21 0.0098 0.0181 
10 3 21 0.0045 0.0127 
Table 4.5 – Observation #4: Experiment 1 Strategy Profile and Payoff Table 
 Although we just saw that stubborn agents target agents with low threshold values, the 
purpose of the second experiment (shown below) is to show that the not only does an 
individual’s threshold value influence strategy decisions, but also the threshold values of his 
neighbors.  In this experiment, we maintain the same default threshold values with the exception 
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that regular agents 50, 51, 52, and 53, increase their threshold values from 0.5 to 0.95.  Thus, we 
assume the following threshold values for this experiment:   
    
                     
              
                 
       
  
Table 4.6 shows the strategy profile and payoff table for this experiment.  Upon 
comparing the strategy profile and payoff table from the baseline scenario (Table 4.3) to Table 
4.6, we see how the threshold values of an agent’s neighbors also factors into determining the 
strength of that agent as a connection strategy.  Previously, both agents 48 and 49 (two village 
leaders located in the same village as regular agents 50-53, were deemed as payoff-maximizing 
strategies by the TB agent.  However, due to the drastic increase in threshold values of the 
regular agents in their village, which subsequently reduces the probability that a stubborn agent 
can forcefully influence the entire village, both agents 48 and 49 are no longer selected as 
strategies by the TB agent. 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 30 -0.0066 0.0016 
2 68 30 -0.0031 0.0051 
3 68 21 0.0117 0.0199 
4 30 21 0.0205 0.0287 
5 30 22 0.0320 0.0402 
6 57 22 0.0411 0.0493 
7 57 23 0.0518 0.0601 
8 56 23 0.0540 0.0622 
9 56 57 0.0613 0.0695 
10 23 57 0.0617 0.0699 
Table 4.6 – Observation #4: Experiment 2 Strategy Profile and Payoff Table 
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4.1.2 How Different Payoff Functions Influence Strategies 
Next, we present a series of experiments which analyze the characteristics of strategies 
under different payoff functions.  Because stubborn agents can have different perspectives on 
their success during the game depending on the specific payoff function they decide to use, the 
strategies that are chosen by a stubborn agent can vary in relation to the payoff function.   In this 
section, we compare the characteristics of the strategies chosen by the players using the ‘number 
of agents won’ payoff in comparison to the strategies chosen by the ‘mean belief’ payoff. 
4.1.2.1 Mean Belief 
We first conduct two experiments where both players use the ‘mean belief’ payoff 
function.  The results from these experiments will serve as the baseline scenarios from which we 
will compare the results to subsequent experiments involving another payoff function described 
earlier—the number of agents won.  Table 4.7 describes the parameter conditions of the two 
experiments. 
 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Network Large (73 agents) Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 30 
# Steps 8 8 
Interactions per Step 300 300 
Connections per Player (z) 1 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [70] TB [70] 
Initial Agent Beliefs Village Mix 1 Village Mix 3 
Table 4.7 – Payoff Function Comparison: Experiment Descriptions 
 Table 4.8 shows the ‘mean belief’ strategy profile and payoff tables for both experiments 
described in Table 4.7.  As discussed earlier in Section 4.1.1 concerning the characteristics of 
strategies, we observe that the strategies chosen by the players in each experiment are dependent 
on the beliefs of the agents in the network.  Thus, each stubborn agent considers the belief of 
each mutable agent when determining which strategy will yield the highest mean belief payoff 
during the current step in the game. 
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 Experiment 1                Experiment 2 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 21 -0.0123 0.0014  1 70 31 -0.0065 0.0017 
2 48 21 -0.0155 -0.0018  2 48 31 -0.0025 0.0058 
3 48 39 -0.0057 0.0080  3 48 39 0.0074 0.0156 
4 49 39 -0.0081 0.0056  4 49 39 0.0068 0.0150 
5 49 40 0.0001 0.0138  5 49 40 0.0155 0.0237 
6 12 40 -0.0010 0.0127  6 39 40 0.0151 0.0233 
7 12 23 0.0051 0.0188  7 39 23 0.0214 0.0296 
8 13 23 0.0008 0.0145  8 12 23 0.0199 0.0281 
Table 4.8 – Payoff Function Comparison: Mean Belief Strategy Profile and Payoff Tables 
4.1.2.2 Number of Agents Won 
Next, we determine the strategies found during the two-player game for the same two 
experiments described in Table 4.7 with the exception that both stubborn agents now use the 
‘number of agents won’ payoff function instead of the ‘mean belief’ payoff function.  By 
conducting the same two experiments with a different payoff function, we gain a better 
understanding of how different payoff functions can alter the strategies that the players pursue 
during the game.  In order to use the ‘number of agents won’ payoff function, we must determine 
the buffer threshold value (B), where B         , which will be used in determining the points 
awarded to each player based on each mutable agent’s belief.  For these experiments we set 
     , which yields the following point system for the two players: 
US Points Awarded Mutable Agent Belief TB Points Awarded 
+1 > 0.1 -1 
0 [-0.1,0.1] 0 
-1 < -0.1 +1 
Table 4.9 – Payoff Function Comparison: Number of Agents Won Point System 
The following table shows the ‘number of agents won’ strategy profile and payoff tables 
for both experiments.  Upon comparing the strategy profile and payoff tables for two different 
payoff functions for each experiment, we notice drastic differences in the strategies that are 
chosen by the two players.  Because points are only awarded to (or subtracted from) a player’s 
payoff as mutable agents change in belief by crossing above or below  B, we find that the 
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incentive for players to target strategies which are near  B in belief is very high when the payoff 
is number of agents won.  On the other hand, when the ‘mean belief’ payoff function is used by 
the players, the incentive to target mutable agents of opposite belief from the player is very high 
as the player’s attempt to influence the mean network belief toward their own belief. 
Experiment 1               Experiment 2 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 31 5 9  1 70 1 -3 -1 
2 1 31 -2 2  2 48 1 -4 -2 
3 1 3 -1 3  3 48 20 -3 -1 
4 12 3 -5 -1  4 1 20 -3 -1 
5 12 1 2 6  5 1 49 -7 -5 
6 3 1 -4 0  6 2 49 -10 -8 
7 3 12 -5 -1  7 2 48 -6 -4 
8 14 12 -8 -4  8 49 48 -15 -13 
Table 4.10 – Payoff Function Comparison: Number of Agents Won Strategy Profile and Payoff 
Tables 
 When viewing the strategy profile and payoff tables in Table 4.10, we find that the 
stubborn agents select mutable agents as strategies who have beliefs close to the buffer threshold 
value ( B).  For instance, in experiment 1, agent 31 has an initial belief of -0.1, while agents 1 
and 3 have initial beliefs of 0.1.  Thus, we find that these influential agents are heavily targeted 
by both players since small deviations in the targeted agents’ beliefs result in noticeable payoff 
changes when using the number of agents won payoff function. 
4.1.2.3 Mean Belief vs. Number of Agents Won 
Now that we have explored two different payoff functions and how a stubborn agent’s 
strategy can differ depending on the specific payoff function that is used, we draw some 
conclusions about which payoff function a player should consider using when viewing their own 
payoff during the game.  Figure 4.9 shows the absolute payoffs over time with respect to the U.S. 
agent during experiments 1 and 2 previously described in Table 4.7.  The plot on the left shows 
the ‘mean belief’ and ‘number of agents won’ payoffs for experiment 1, while the plot on the 
right shows both payoffs for experiment 2.  Upon visual comparison of the payoff plots and 
subsequent empirical evidence, we notice that the ‘number of agents won’ payoff function can 
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lead to high variations in a player’s payoff over time, while the ‘mean belief’ payoff function 
yields payoffs for a player which are less subject to high deviations.  
        Experiment 1           Experiment 2 
 
Figure 4.9 – Payoff Function Comparison: Mean Belief and Number of Agents Won Payoff Plots 
 A great example of the potential for high variations in a player’s payoff over time when 
using the ‘number of agents won’ payoff function is seen in Figure 4.10 below which shows the 
absolute payoff plots for an identical experiment as experiment 2 with the exception that the 
game is carried out for 20 steps rather than 8 steps. 
Experiment 2 (20-Step Game) 
 
Figure 4.10 – Payoff Function Comparison: Payoff Plots for 20-Step Experiment 2 
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 Thus, as we observe from the payoff plots for the 20-step game for experiment 2, the 
number of agents (nodes) won payoff is highly variable for the players.  After step 8, the payoff 
for the U.S. agent is -15 (which means that the Taliban agent has ‘won’ 15 more agents in the 
network to supporting the Taliban than the U.S. agent has supporting the United States cause).  
However, after only 5 more steps, the payoff has changed by 22 points such that the U.S. agent 
now has the advantage in the game with a payoff of +7.  Therefore, if a stubborn agent is risk 
averse, and therefore wants to minimize the possibility of huge changes in payoff over time, the 
‘mean belief’ payoff should be used since the ‘number of agents won’ payoff is more subject to 
higher variations.  Lastly, we note from experimental evidence that the degree of variability in 
the ‘number of agents won’ payoff is largely determined by the buffer threshold value (B) that is 
determined, and specifically, how many agents in the network have beliefs which are near the 
buffer threshold value—i.e. the more agents which are close to the buffer allows for bigger 
changes in payoff over time as only slight changes in those agents’ beliefs equate to +/-1 changes 
in ‘number of agents won’ payoff for a player.  
4.1.3 Sensitivity to Model Parameters 
We previously discussed that threshold values are extremely sensitive parameters in 
determining strategies for the two-player, dynamic game.  However, we present a few additional 
model parameters which can also influence the strategies chosen by the players during the game 
and the rate of belief diffusion in the network. 
4.1.3.1 Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Values (α, β, and γ) 
Different Types of Societies 
The default      and   values which were developed by our predecessor’s modeling 
approach [8] in conjunction with the MIT Political Science Department are primarily used in our 
experiments since they were created to accurately represent Pashtun society in Afghanistan.  
However, our modeling approach can easily be extended to analyze opinion dynamics in other 
societal types, such as Western (democratic), consensus, and hierarchical societies, by simply 
changing the interaction-type probabilities (     and   values) for the agents in the network.   
Table 4.11 below shows different alpha, beta, and gamma values that are assigned depending on 
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the type of society that is modeled by the network.  Our motivation is to determine how the 
propagation of beliefs in the threshold model is affected by different society types, and more 
specifically, different      and   values.   
Society Type Description alpha matrix 
 
beta matrix 
Default normal values for  0 0 0 0   1 0 0 0 
 
Pashtun society 1 0 0 0   0 0.1 0.1 0 
 
  1 0.4 0 0   0 0.1 0.1 0 
 
  1 1 1 0   0 0 0 0 
 
  
         Consensus everyone averages, 0 0 0 0   1 1 1 0 
 
except stubborn 0 0 0 0   1 1 1 0 
 
agents 0 0 0 0   1 1 1 0 
 
  1 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
  
         Hierarchical forcefully influence 0 0 0 0   1 0 0 0 
 
all lower nodes, 1 0 0 0   0 1 0 0 
 
avg. with same level 1 1 0 0   0 0 1 0 
 
  1 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
  
         Western realistic democratic 0.1 0 0 0   0.9 0.1 0.1 0 
 
society 0.5 0.1 0 0   0.1 0.5 0.1 0 
 
  0.9 0.5 0.1 0   0.1 0.1 0.5 0 
 
  1 1 1 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
Note: Gamma matrix values are found by the following equation:               
Table 4.11 – Alpha, Beta, Gamma Values for Different Society Types 
Society Type Experiments 
We conducted experiments with identical conditions with the exception of the      and   
values that represent the four society types in the table above.  By doing so, we can better gauge 
the effect that different      and   values have on the evolution of beliefs in the network over 
time.  A description of the experiment set is found in the table below. 
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Experiment Set Description 
Network Toy (16 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 50 
Interactions per Step 100 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [1] 
Initial Agent Beliefs All -0.5 
Society Type 
1. Default 
2. Consensus 
3. Hierarchical 
4. Western 
Table 4.12 – Different Society Types (          values): Experiment Set Description 
 The plot below (Figure 4.11) shows the ‘mean belief’ payoff with respect to the U.S. 
agent during the two-player game conducted for the four types of societies described in Table 
4.12.  A significant difference exists between the payoffs of the U.S. agent for the consensus 
society compared to the payoffs of the other three types of societies, all three of which yielded 
similar payoffs as the network beliefs evolved over time.  The main difference between the 
consensus society and the other three societies is that the probability of averaging (      ) 
interactions occurring in the consensus society between two agents is much higher than the other 
societies, whereas the probability of forceful (      ) interactions occurring in the other three 
societies is more prominent than in the consensus society.  Moreover, upon viewing the payoff 
plots over time in Figure 4.11 for the default, hierarchical, and Western societies, we recognize 
that the payoff results are highly robust to considerable variations in the      and   values.  
Meanwhile, the consensus society is considered radically different in its interaction-type 
characteristics compared to the other three societies due to the absence of forceful (        
interactions occurring between interacting mutable agents.  Thus, the robustness of the      and 
  values gives us a higher degree of confidence in our results, even if there are inaccuracies in 
these values. 
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Figure 4.11 – Different Society Types (          values): Mean Belief Payoff Plot 
As we have seen by this example, and subsequent empirical evidence, the evolution of 
beliefs in the networks depends upon the interaction-type probabilities, which are specified by 
the           values.  The table below summarizes the general effect that these values have on 
the propagation of beliefs in the networks under the threshold model.  Thus, we find that the 
diffusion of beliefs in different societies can be very different depending on the probabilities 
interaction-type probabilities. 
 
Effect on Evolution of Beliefs 
Increased Probability of        interactions 
Increased deviations in network beliefs away from 
initial network beliefs will result as the probability 
of forceful interactions increases. 
Increased Probability of        interactions 
Initial starting beliefs will more likely prevail with 
increased probability of averaging interactions, 
which results in small deviations away from initial 
network beliefs. 
Increased Probability of        interactions 
Initial starting beliefs will more likely prevail with 
increased probability of identity interactions as 
agents will exhibit no change in belief when 
identity interactions occur, which thus results in 
small deviations away from initial network beliefs. 
Table 4.13 – Different Society Types (          values): Effect of Evolution of Beliefs 
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4.1.3.2 Expected Number of Interactions per Step (μ) 
During the two-player game, a player locates a strategy that is expected to yield the best 
payoff after   pairwise interactions occur in the network, after which the opposing player will 
reevaluate their current strategy and subsequently find their next strategy.  We often fix the 
number of pairwise interactions that occur between steps in the experiments in order to create an 
equal and more symmetric game for the two opposing stubborn agents.  However, we pose the 
following question concerning the number of interactions per step: “If given the opportunity, 
would stubborn agents prefer more opportunities to reevaluate their current strategy and choose a 
new strategy (i.e. more steps) but with fewer interactions per step, or would they rather prefer 
fewer steps but with more interactions per step, where both scenarios result in the same total 
number of pairwise interactions occurring during the game?” 
The following table details the conditions of the experiments that were conducted to 
analyze this question: 
Experiment Set Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 
1. 10 
2. 30 
Interactions per Step 
1. 300 
2. 100 
Connections per Player (z) 2 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [69, 70] 
Initial Agent Beliefs All Random 
Payoff Function for TB 
A. Mean Belief 
B. Random Selection 
(excluding regulars) 
C. Random Selection 
(including regulars) 
Payoff Function for US 
A. Mean Belief 
B. Mean Belief 
C. Mean Belief 
Table 4.14 –   Sensitivity: Experiment Set Description 
 In total, we performed six experiments:  two different scenarios (10 steps with 300 
interactions per step vs. 30 steps with 100 interactions per step) each on three different payoff 
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functions for the TB agent—(1) mean belief, (2) choosing a random strategy excluding all 
regular agents, and (3) choosing a random strategy including regular agents.  The US agent 
maintained the mean belief payoff function during all experiments.  Table 4.15 shows the mean 
belief payoff with respect to the US agent at the end of the game for each experiment.   
  Payoff: 
A 
Payoff: 
B 
Payoff: 
C 
Exp 1 (10 steps, 300 
interactions per step) 
0.0091 0.0461 0.0574 
Exp 2 (30 steps, 100 
interactions per step) 
0.0100 0.0529 0.0826 
Table 4.15 –   Sensitivity: Experiment Set Payoff Table 
Thus, based on the experimental evidence, we conclude that stubborn agents would prefer 
more opportunities (steps) to update their strategies, but with fewer interactions per step since the 
potential for higher payoffs can be obtained when a stubborn agent is given more opportunities 
to reevaluate his current strategy during the two-player game.  In a realistic environment, 
whereby opposing players do not necessarily know the strategies of one another with certainty, 
the players would benefit most by reevaluating their strategies as soon as possible upon receiving 
intelligence about the opposing stubborn agent’s current strategy.  Moreover, upon analyzing the 
strategy profile and payoff tables from the experiments, we conclude that the strategies chosen 
by the players to maximize their payoffs are sensitive to the specific   parameter (see Table B.3 
in Appendix B).  Table B.3 shows that the strategies which maximize a player’s payoff are 
subject to change depending on how many interactions occur per step in the network. 
4.1.3.3 Initial (Step 0) Strategy for One Stubborn Agent 
Another parameter which can subsequently impact the strategies that are selected by the 
stubborn agents is the strategy that is fixed for one stubborn agent during step 0, which is used to 
initiate the start of the two-player game.  The strategy that is initially selected by a stubborn 
agent can alter the strategy profiles that are chosen by the stubborn agents during the subsequent 
steps of the game.  We present the following example detailed in Table 4.16 below whereby we 
examine the strategy profile and payoff tables for two experiments with the same initial 
conditions, with the exception that the initial, fixed strategy for the TB agent during step 0 is 
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different.  The motivation behind this experiment is to show that the strategy chosen by the 
stubborn agent during step 0 as the initial strategy can subsequently impact the strategies and 
payoffs during the rest of the game. 
Experiment Set Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 10 
Interactions per Step 300 
Connections per Player (z) 2 
Initial, Fixed Strategy 
1. TB [1] 
2. TB [70] 
Initial Agent Beliefs Village Mix 0 
Table 4.16 – Initial (Step 0) Strategy for Stubborn Agent: Experiment Set Description 
 As the following strategy profile and payoff tables for the two experiments reveal (see 
Table 4.17 below), the initial strategy chosen for the TB agent during step 0 (agent 1 during 
experiment 1 and agent 70 during experiment 2) subsequently impacts the payoffs and 
successive strategies that are chosen by the players throughout the entire game.  However, we do 
observe similarities between several of the strategies that are chosen by the players in both 
experiments, but the order in which they are selected as strategies can be affected by the initial 
(step 0) strategy that is selected for a stubborn agent. 
Experiment 1     Experiment 2 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
 Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
1 1 72 -0.0036 
 
1 70 72 -0.0027 
2 69 72 -0.0102 
 
2 68 72 -0.0074 
3 69 12 -0.0049 
 
3 68 39 0.0006 
4 21 12 -0.0096 
 
4 21 39 -0.0024 
5 21 13 -0.0071 
 
5 21 12 0.0042 
6 23 13 -0.0141 
 
6 23 12 0.0001 
7 23 39 -0.0130 
 
7 23 13 0.0057 
8 13 39 -0.0181 
 
8 12 13 0.0008 
9 13 48 -0.0140 
 
9 12 49 0.0057 
10 39 48 -0.0157 
 
10 13 49 0.0029 
Table 4.17 – Initial (Step 0) Strategy for Stubborn Agent: Strategy Profile and Payoff Tables 
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4.1.3.4 Penalty for Identical Strategy (λ) 
In Chapter 3 we discussed the motivation behind implementing a penalty for identical 
connections among stubborn agents.  Now, we explore cases where the   penalty factor may or 
may not be necessary for limiting identical connection strategies.  Table 4.18 shows the 
experiment set description for the experiments analyzing how stubborn agents select strategies 
under different initial network beliefs when no penalty is inflicted on their ‘mean belief’ payoffs 
for identical strategies. 
Experiment Set Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 10 
Interactions per Step 300 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [70] 
Penalty for Identical Strategy ( )     (none) 
Initial Agent Beliefs 
1. Village Mix 0 
2. All +0.2 
3. Village Mix 3 
4. All Random 
5. Village Mix 5 
Table 4.18 – Penalty for Identical Strategy ( ): Experiment Set Description 
 Table 4.19 shows the strategy profile and payoff tables for experiments 1 and 2 described 
in the table above.  We indicate strategies which are identical during a particular step with red 
text.  Experiment 1 (Village Mix 0) contains villages of various beliefs (both pro-US and pro-
TB) which are clustered homogenously by village, whereas experiment 2 (All +0.2) contains a 
completely homogenous network whereby all agents have initial beliefs of +0.2 (i.e. marginally 
pro-US).  Upon inspection of the strategy profile and payoff tables for these two experiments and 
the other three experiments listed in the table above, we observe that the penalty for identical 
strategies is not always necessary for preventing identical connection strategies among stubborn 
agents. 
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Experiment 1     Experiment 2 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff  
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
1 70 72 -0.0027 
 
1 70 70 0.1995 
2 68 72 -0.0076 
 
2 67 70 0.1977 
3 68 39 0.0003 
 
3 67 67 0.1977 
4 21 39 -0.0029 
 
4 57 67 0.1941 
5 21 49 0.0030 
 
5 57 57 0.1947 
6 23 49 -0.0015 
 
6 67 57 0.1924 
7 23 48 0.0042 
 
7 67 67 0.1945 
8 49 48 0.0014 
 
8 57 67 0.1909 
9 49 13 0.0064 
 
9 57 57 0.1933 
10 48 13 0.0041 
 
10 67 57 0.1915 
Table 4.19 – Penalty for Identical Strategy ( ): Experiments 1 and 2 Strategy Profile and Payoff 
Tables 
We first observe that networks which contain initial network beliefs representing both 
sides of the belief spectrum (both pro-US and pro-TB agents) do not necessarily require the 
penalty for identical strategies as stubborn agents are motivated to target agents of highly 
opposite belief (when such strategies are available in the network) since these strategies offer 
higher payoffs.  Meanwhile, for networks which contain mostly, or completely, homogenous 
beliefs (such as experiment 2), or networks which may have different beliefs clustered 
homogenously by village, yet the majority of all agents in the network are still highly supportive 
of one stubborn agent (such as experiment 5), identical strategies are prone to exist without the 
use of the   penalty.  Moreover, for networks which are prone to identical strategies, the 
stubborn agent who is ‘winning’ the game based on the absolute payoff from the initial network 
beliefs has the incentive to choose the identical strategy as the opposing stubborn agent, while 
the ‘losing’ stubborn agent is motivated not to choose the same strategy as the ‘winning’ 
stubborn agent.  We observe this interesting finding by viewing the strategy profile for 
experiment 2 in Table 4.19 and subsequently provide the rationale behind this observation.   
In experiment 2, the initial mean network belief is +0.2, indicating that the U.S. agent is 
initially ‘winning’ the game.  Upon each U.S. step during the 10-step game, the U.S. agent 
chooses the same strategy as the TB agent in order to minimize the potential payoff loss due to 
the TB agent’s influence in the network (i.e. the U.S. and TB agents exert equal influence on the 
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same targeted strategy for identical connection strategies).  From an intuitive perspective, it 
makes sense that the U.S. agent is motivated to choose identical strategies as the TB agent since 
the U.S. agent is initially ‘winning’ the beliefs of the agents in the network, and thus, attempts to 
thwart the negative influence from the TB agent by choosing the same strategies.  Meanwhile, 
during each TB step, the TB agent selects a strategy not presently occupied by the U.S. agent in 
order to have full (and not shared) influence over the targeted agent(s) in order to have the 
greatest chance of increasing his payoff.   
4.2 Analysis of ‘Selective Search’ and ‘Sequential Search’ 
Heuristics 
In Chapter 3 we introduced the ‘Selective Search’ and ‘Sequential Search’ heuristics as 
methods used to significantly reduce the computational time (compared to exhaustive 
enumeration) necessary to find strategies in large, complex networks with multiple connections 
per stubborn agent.  In Section 4.2.1 we present the run time approximations for both heuristic 
methods as well as exhaustive enumeration followed by example network cases whereby the use 
of the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm is necessary for finding solutions as the run times 
for exhaustive enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ become intractable. Later, in Section 4.2.2, 
we present a payoff maximization comparison between the three methods on identical scenarios.  
The purpose of this comparison is to analyze how the quality of the solutions obtained by each 
heuristic compare to the solutions found using exhaustive enumeration. 
4.2.1 Run Time Comparison:  Exhaustive Enumeration vs. ‘Selective Search’ 
vs. ‘Sequential Search’ 
Before we analyze the quality of the solutions obtained by the ‘Sequential Search’ 
Greedy Algorithm, we first present the run time approximation equations for the exhaustive 
enumeration, ‘Selective Search’, and ‘Sequential Search’.  Moreover, we provide example cases 
and their run time approximations to give the reader a better understanding of the computational 
savings afforded by the use of the two heuristic methods.  The run time approximation for 
exhaustively enumerating all possible strategies without the use of ‘Selective Search’ is: 
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  (4.1)  
The run time approximation for the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic is: 
                                                    
  (4.2)  
Meanwhile, the run time approximation for the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm (after the 
‘Selective Search’ Heuristic is applied to remove all combinations of regular agents from the 
strategy space) is: 
                                                       (4.3)  
        is the network parameter associated with the specific network  
The   network parameter is on the order of      for the networks used in this thesis.  For 
the small, 16 node network seen in Figure 3.7,             while for large, 73 node network 
seen in Figure 3.9,            .  It is important to note that the computational times for both 
the exhaustive enumeration method (4.1) and the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic (4.2) increase 
linearly with the number of steps in the game, the expected number of interactions per step, and 
the number of realizations of the Monte Carlo simulation, while they increase exponentially with 
the number of connections per stubborn agent.  The difference between these two methods is the 
size of the strategy space that is searched:       vs.          which is due to the removal of all 
strategies containing regular agents under the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic.  On the other hand, 
the run time for the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm (4.3) increases linearly with all 
inputs, including the number of connections per stubborn agent.  Therefore, as the number of 
connections per stubborn agent increases, the run time for the greedy algorithm scales very well 
as opposed to the run times for exhaustive enumeration and the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic. 
 Table 4.20 shows the run time approximations for the exhaustive enumeration method, 
the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic and the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm using the large, 
73 node network under different conditions for the number of connections per stubborn agent.  
For all cases we assume a 10-step game, with 300 interactions per step, and 30 realizations of the 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Exhaustive 
Enumeration 
'Selective 
Search' 
'Sequential 
Search' 
    15.2 min 7.3 min 7.3 min 
    18 hr 30 min 4 hr 15 min 14.6 min 
    56 days 6 hr 6 days 5 hr 21.9 min 
               years          years 1 hr 13 min 
Table 4.20 – Run Time Approximation Comparison Table 
 Table 4.20 shows the significant advantage offered by the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy 
Algorithm in terms of run time scalability for scenarios where the number of connections per 
stubborn agent is greater than one (   ).  For a realistically small example of     
connections per stubborn agent, the run times for the exhaustive enumeration method (56 days 6 
hours) and ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic (6 days 5 hours) become quite cumbersome, while the 
‘Sequential Search’ run time of approximately 22 minutes is very acceptable.  As the number of 
connections increases further, for instance      , the computational times for both exhaustive 
enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ become intractable, while the ‘Sequential Search’ method 
takes just over one hour. 
4.2.2 Payoff Maximization:  Exhaustive Enumeration vs. ‘Selective Search’ 
vs. ‘Sequential Search’ 
Although we have seen the ability of the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm to 
drastically reduce the computational time for cases where the number of connections per 
stubborn agent is greater than one, there is an inherent tradeoff in the quality of the obtained 
solutions since the greedy algorithm significantly reduces the strategy space that is searched by 
each player.  Thus, the question we must determine is to what extent the greedy algorithm 
jeopardizes the quality of the solutions.  If ‘Sequential Search’ is able to obtain solutions of 
similar quality compared to exhaustive enumeration, then we increase our willingness to accept 
the tradeoff between having lower quality solutions with dramatically reduced run times instead 
of guaranteeing solutions of no worse quality but with exceptionally longer computational times 
under exhaustive enumeration or ‘Selective Search’. 
 We present three experiments which analyze the quality of the solutions that are found by 
the three methods.  In all experiments, the large, 73 agent network was used under different 
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conditions.  The first key conclusion from the solution comparisons is that the ‘Selective Search’ 
Heuristic found precisely the same strategies selected by the exhaustive enumeration method.  
This finding seems intuitively obvious given the presence of numerous influential agents in the 
large network, which subsequently makes connecting to regular agents unappealing.  Details of 
the first experiment and its results are found in the tables below. 
Experiment 1 Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 8 
Interactions per Step 100 
Connections per Player (z) 2 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [1, 70] 
Initial Agent Beliefs 0 
Table 4.21 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 1 Description 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [1, 70] [1, 39] 0.0001 0.0001 
2 [13, 39] [1, 39] -0.0004 -0.0004 
3 [13, 39] [13, 38] 0.0002 0.0002 
4 [1, 38] [13, 38] -0.002 -0.002 
5 [1, 38] [38, 39] -0.0007 -0.0007 
6 [13, 39] [38, 39] -0.0026 -0.0026 
7 [13, 39] [1, 13] -0.0014 -0.0014 
8 [13, 40] [1, 13] -0.0021 -0.0021 
Table 4.22 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 1 Exhaustive Enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ 
Results 
Step 
# 
TB Strategy US Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [1, 70] [1, 39] 0.0001 0.0001 
2 [13, 39] [1, 39] -0.0004 -0.0004 
3 [13, 39] [13, 38] 0.0002 0.0002 
4 [1, 1 (38)] [13, 38] -0.0016 -0.0016 
5 [1, 1 (38)] [39 (38) ,39] -0.0004 -0.0004 
6 [13, 38 (39)] [39 (38) ,39] -0.0024 -0.0024 
7 [13, 38 (39)] [1, 13] -0.0009 -0.0009 
8 [39 (38), 39 (40)] [1, 13] -0.0018 -0.0018 
Table 4.23 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 1 ‘Sequential Search’ Results 
106 
 
 For the results of the ‘Sequential Search’ method, we designated a strategy connection as 
incorrectly matching the exhaustive enumeration solution with red text and include the 
exhaustive enumeration solution in parenthesis next to the incorrect strategy.  Thus, when 
viewing the results from experiment 1, we note that the first three steps for ‘Sequential Search’ 
identically match those strategies found by exhaustive enumeration.  Also, for steps 4 thru 8, 12 
out of 20 strategy connections were identical.  What is important to note, though, is of the 8 
strategy connections that did not match the exhaustive enumeration solutions, all but two of them 
were agents located within the same village as the agents in the exhaustive enumeration 
strategies.  Agents 38, 39, and 40 are all influential agents located in the same village, and thus 
offer very similar payoffs to the players.  Thus, although the greedy algorithm incorrectly 
swapped these strategies, the detriment to each player’s payoff was insignificant. 
 The second experiment was conducted using the same conditions as experiment 1 but 
with a different initial, fixed strategy for the Taliban agent.  Details of experiment 2 and its 
results are found in the following tables below: 
 
Experiment 2 Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 8 
Interactions per Step 100 
Connections per Player (z) 2 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [48, 49] 
Initial Agent Beliefs 0 
Table 4.24 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 2 Description 
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Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [48, 49] [1, 39] 0.0001 0.0001 
2 [13, 48] [1, 39] 0.0000 0.0000 
3 [13, 48] [40, 47] 0.0003 0.0003 
4 [39, 39] [40, 47] -0.0012 -0.0012 
5 [39, 39] [13, 13] 0.0000 0.0000 
6 [40, 47] [13, 13] -0.0029 -0.0029 
7 [40, 47] [39, 39] -0.0025 -0.0025 
8 [13, 13] [39, 39] -0.0056 -0.0056 
Table 4.25 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 2 Exhaustive Enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ 
Results 
Step 
# 
TB Strategy US Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [48, 49] [1, 39] 0.0001 0.0001 
2 [13, 38 (48)] [1, 39] 0.0000 0.0000 
3 [13, 38 (48)] [48 (40), 48 (47)] -0.0002 -0.0002 
4 [39, 39] [48 (40), 48 (47)] -0.0020 -0.0020 
5 [39, 39] [13, 13] -0.0008 -0.0008 
6 [40, 48 (47)] [13, 13] -0.0039 -0.0039 
7 [40, 48 (47)] [38 (39), 39] -0.0031 -0.0031 
8 [13, 13] [38 (39), 39] -0.0059 -0.0059 
Table 4.26 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 2 ‘Sequential Search’ Results 
 The strategy profile of experiment 2 for the greedy algorithm did not fare quite as well as 
experiment 1 as the first incorrect strategy was chosen during step 2.  In total, 10 strategy 
connections did not match the exhaustive enumeration solution compared to 8 from experiment 
1.  If a mistake is made earlier in the game by the greedy algorithm, we expect more mistakes to 
occur during the game as the initial mistake will influence the subsequent decisions made by the 
greedy algorithm during the rest of the game.  We point out that the follow-on mistakes made by 
the greedy algorithm in subsequent steps could be attributable to the fact that the greedy 
algorithm is trying to optimize the strategy for a player based on the opponent’s strategy.  If the 
opponent’s strategy did not match the exhaustive enumeration solution then optimizing the 
strategy for the other player based on this incorrect strategy may only further lead to mismatches 
with the exhaustive enumeration strategy profile.  For instance, during step 2 the TB agent was 
supposed to select agent 48 as a connection strategy, but instead chose agent 38.  Upon the next 
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step, the US agent selects agent 48 rather than agents 40 and 47.  Thus, although the greedy 
algorithm incorrectly chose agent 38 in step 2 for the TB agent instead of agent 48, we notice 
that during step 3, because agent 48 was not previously chosen, the greedy algorithm now 
recognized agent 48 as a quality strategy and the US agent subsequently chooses this strategy. 
 The last experiment was performed using the same network but with different initial 
agent beliefs and     connections per stubborn agent.  The description of experiment 3 and its 
results are found in the tables below. 
Experiment 3 Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 6 
Interactions per Step 100 
Connections per Player (z) 3 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [48, 49, 54] 
Initial Agent Beliefs Village Mix 4 
Table 4.27 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 3 Description 
Step 
# 
TB Strategy US Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [48, 49, 54] [1, 1, 39] -0.0150 0.0001 
2 [49, 49, 73] [1, 1, 39] -0.0151 -0.0001 
3 [49, 49, 73] [47, 49, 54] -0.0154 -0.0003 
4 [48, 48, 48] [47, 49, 54] -0.0227 -0.0077 
5 [48, 48, 48] [38, 40, 47] -0.0208 -0.0058 
6 [49, 49, 54] [38, 40, 47] -0.0290 -0.0140 
Table 4.28 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 3 Exhaustive Enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ 
Results 
 Step 
# 
TB Strategy US Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [48, 49, 54] [1, 1, 39] -0.0150 0.0001 
2 [13 (49), 40 (49), 73] [1, 1, 39] -0.0151 0.0000 
3 [13 (49), 40 (49), 73] [47, 69 (49), 72 (54)] -0.0144 0.0007 
4 [12 (48), 14 (48), 19 (48)] [47, 69 (49), 72 (54)] -0.0199 -0.0048 
5 [12 (48), 14 (48), 19 (48)] [14 (38), 40, 47] -0.0187 -0.0036 
6 [13 (49), 13 (49), 13 (54)] [14 (38), 40, 47] -0.0213 -0.0063 
Table 4.29 – Payoff Maximization: Experiment 3 ‘Sequential Search’ Results 
109 
 
 As the number of connections per stubborn agent increases, the proportion of the entire 
strategy space that is not searched by the greedy algorithm also increases.  Therefore, in the third 
experiment the greedy algorithm had more errors in finding the same strategies as exhaustive 
enumeration, as expected, than the previous two experiments.  However, there were instances 
were some of the strategies found by the greedy algorithm identically matched those found 
through exhaustive enumeration, such as the strategies selected in step 1.  Even though 
exhaustive enumeration can guarantee solutions of no worse quality compared to the greedy 
algorithm, the computational time becomes impractical very quickly.  Table 4.30 below shows 
the run time comparisons for all three experiments for each method.   
 
Run Time Comparison 
 
Exhaustive 
Enumeration 
'Selective 
Search' 
'Sequential 
Search' 
Experiment 1 1 hr 42 min 23 min 1.3 min 
Experiment 2 1 hr 42 min 23 min 1.3 min 
Experiment 3 3 days 18 hr 13 min 9 hr 57 min 1.5 min 
Table 4.30 – Payoff Maximization: Run Times 
As we see, even for the relatively small number of total pairwise interactions (600) and 
10 realizations which occurred during experiment 3, almost four days were needed days to find 
the solutions through exhaustive enumeration and nearly 10 hours using the ‘Selective Search’ 
Heuristic.  On the other hand, the ‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm took just 90 seconds to 
find its solutions.  Thus, even though exhaustive enumeration and ‘Selective Search’ provide no 
worse (and often better) solutions than the greedy algorithm , such huge reductions in run times 
provided by ‘Sequential Search’, especially for highly complex network scenarios, increase our 
willingness to accept lower quality solutions.  For instance, given the time constraints in a 
realistic setting such as military leaders choosing which village leaders to communicate with in 
Afghanistan, rapidly determining decent strategies in a fraction of the time is likely to be more 
attractive than spending days or even months to precisely determine incrementally better 
strategies, especially since the landscape of the battlefield may have already changed by then.  
Therefore, the greedy algorithm is a good tool that should provide acceptable solutions whenever 
the computational time becomes too burdensome to handle. 
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4.3 Population-Focused Actions Which Affect Belief Propagation 
In this section we introduce population-focused actions which the players can use in 
order to influence the belief propagation throughout the network.  In a realistic environment, 
such as Afghanistan, the U.S. military and Taliban insurgents will unlikely limit themselves to 
strictly direct communications with the local populace in order to win over the minds of the 
people toward supporting their cause.  Although much emphasis is placed on face-to-face 
communications with the local population, research on the attitudes of the local populace has 
shown that Afghanis also “subscribe to the axiom that deeds speak louder than words” [24].  
Subsequently, the U.S. military also seeks to increase popular support by aiding the Afghani 
people with stimulus projects.  These stimulus projects may include but are not limited to—
building a school, well, or road for a village and/or giving money for economic projects.  On the 
other hand, the Taliban insurgents may give death threats or assassinate villagers who are 
deemed to be in direct support of the counterinsurgency effort.  Because these population-
focused actions by both the U.S. military and Taliban insurgents will affect the opinions of the 
populace, we expand the two-player game to incorporate the ability for the US and TB agents to 
strategically use these additional resources. 
4.3.1 U.S. Stimulus Projects 
Description 
We implement the ability for the US agent to conduct stimulus projects during the two-player 
game as follows: 
 The number of stimulus projects that will occur during the game is predetermined. 
 A limit of one stimulus project can occur per U.S. step during the game. 
 No stimulus projects may occur during a TB step. 
 We designate four different types of stimulus projects (build a school, well, or 
road, or give money), yet we can easily allow for more types. 
 Given the predetermined number of stimulus projects set to occur during the 
game, we either randomly or selectively choose the type of project to occur as 
well as the U.S. step for which it will occur. 
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 Given a stimulus project is to occur during a U.S. step, the U.S. agent updates his 
strategy per one of the specified payoff-maximization approaches discussed in 
section 3.3.4, but while simultaneously taking into consideration the impact the 
stimulus project will have on the beliefs of the agents in the network due to the 
stimulus project in an attempt to yield the highest payoff. 
 The effect of the stimulus project: 
o The targeted agent, which is selected as the U.S. connection strategy 
during the step, and all of the mutable agents (nodes) that are adjacent to 
the agent that is targeted for the stimulus project will receive a one-time 
‘belief shock’ from the stimulus project.  All other mutable agents receive 
no belief shock from the stimulus project. 
o The belief shock follows a sinusoidal function (see below), and can either 
be positive or negative depending on the prior belief of the individual 
before the stimulus project occurs 
DEFINTION: 
We define the set of mutable agents who receive a belief shock from a U.S. stimulus project that 
occurs during step k of the two-player game as:  
                                                       
The belief of agent   is updated due to the stimulus project occurring during step k and time t as 
follows: 
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 Figure 4.12 depicts the belief shock curves for the four types of stimulus projects using 
the default parameters discussed above.  Given an agent’s current belief,       on the x-axis, the 
value of the belief shock that is added to the agent’s belief is found on the y-axis.  We see that a 
stimulus project can have either a positive or negative impact on an agent’s belief depending on 
the agent’s belief before the project occurs and the phaseshift value.  The phaseshift value 
represents the prior belief of an agent in which the stimulus project has no effect on the 
subsequent belief of the agent.  For example, in Figure 4.12, the phaseshift value is -0.2, which 
means any agent with a belief of -0.2 before the stimulus project will remain with the same belief 
of -0.2 after the project.  Meanwhile, all agents with a belief greater than the phaseshift value 
will increase their beliefs of varying degrees due to the project, while all agents with a belief less 
than the phaseshift value will decrease their beliefs because of the stimulus project. 
 
Figure 4.12 – Stimulus Project Default Belief Shocks 
The motivation behind this implementation is that not all villagers will react the same 
way to a stimulus project by U.S. forces.  For instance, agents who hold strongly negative 
opinions of the United States may only be further enraged by the stimulus project affecting their 
village, and therefore, may subsequently strengthen their hatred of the U.S. (i.e. the stimulus 
project would decrease their prior belief).  Note, however, that agents strictly have beliefs 
between [-0.5, 0.5].  An agent who theoretically would have a belief below -0.5 or above +0.5 
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due to a stimulus project will subsequently have their beliefs readjusted to the extreme value of   
-0.5 or +0.5, respectively, in order to stay consistent with the modeling approach.  
Sensitivity to Parameters 
 In order to find the appropriate default values of the parameters which determine the 
belief shock values of the agents due to stimulus projects, we conducted a series of experiments 
aimed at finding reasonable empirical bounds for the parameters.  The goal was to find realistic 
amplitude and phaseshift values given a fixed value of 2 for the period.  All experiments were 
conducted using the same conditions exception for variations in the amplitude and phaseshift 
values.  The details of the experiments are found in the Table 4.31. 
Phaseshift and Amplitude Sensitivity 
Experiment Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 10 
# Stimulus Projects 3 (steps 5, 7, 9) 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [1] 
Initial Agent Beliefs Village Mix 1 
Table 4.31 – Phaseshift and Amplitude Sensitivity Experiment Description 
Table 4.32 below shows the payoff for the U.S. agent at the end of the 10-step game for 
each experiment using the ‘mean belief’ payoff function.  Three stimulus projects were used by 
the U.S. agent during step 5 (well), step 7 (school), and step 9 (school).  All three projects were 
the same type and occurred during the same step in each experiment for equivalent comparison 
between experiments with different values for amplitude and phaseshift.  The amplitude values 
ranged from 25% to 200% of the default values shown earlier, while the phaseshift value ranged 
from 0 to -0.3.  As we have seen in previous experiments, because the U.S. and TB agents use 
the same payoff-maximization methods for choosing their strategies, the relative payoffs during 
the game are very small and close to zero.  Thus, the payoff gain from stimulus projects should 
also be small in comparison and not too overpowering such that communications with village 
leaders become obsolete.   
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The red box in the Table 4.32 shows the empirical bounds for the amplitude and 
phaseshift values which are deemed realistic payoff gains for the U.S., and the bold number 
corresponds to the chosen default amplitude and phaseshift values.  In general, as the amplitude 
value increases and the phaseshift value decreases, the payoff increases as expected.  However, 
setting the amplitude too high and the phaseshift too low will result in unrealistically high payoff 
gains from the stimulus projects (i.e. amplitudes 200% of the default value and a phaseshift of -
0.3 results in 0.2289 relative payoff).  Meanwhile, setting the amplitude too low and the 
phaseshift too high will result in pessimistically low payoff gains from the stimulus projects 
which would make their use in the game negligible.  The reader should keep in mind that a total 
of 3 stimulus projects were used to produce these payoff gains.  Thus, the relative payoff gain 
from a single project would be much less than the payoffs seen below.   
  
Phaseshift 
  
0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e
 25% 0.0141 0.0165 0.0235 0.0225 
50% 0.0085 0.0128 0.039 0.054 
original 0.0199 0.0396 0.0434 0.1003 
150% 0.0366 0.0657 0.096 0.1691 
200% 0.0462 0.0716 0.129 0.2289 
Table 4.32 – Relative U.S. ‘Mean Belief’ Payoffs for Various Phaseshift and Amplitude Values 
Belief Propagation with Stimulus Projects 
We wish to understand how the use of stimulus projects can affect the evolution of 
beliefs in the network during the course of the two-player game.  In Afghanistan, for instance, 
U.S. military commanders would like to know what effect stimulus projects are having on the 
opinions of the Afghanistan people, and whether or not such projects are deemed cost effective.  
After subsequent experiments of analyzing how the stimulus projects affect the propagation of 
beliefs in the network we have observed the following: 
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OBSERVATION 
  U.S. stimulus projects have the ability to cause long-lasting changes in the beliefs of 
mutable agents in the network and can subsequently be referred to as game-changing actions 
available to the U.S. agent. 
Example 
 We present an example below (see Table 4.33) which shows how the use of stimulus 
projects can result in long-lasting ‘shocks’ to the beliefs of the agents in the network and leads to 
an advantageous payoff for the U.S. agent.  The initial belief of all mutable agents in the network 
is neutral.  Three different stimulus projects occur during the beginning of the 20-step game—
step 1 (well), step 3 (road), and step 5 (school).  Moreover, the default values for the amplitude 
of each stimulus project, the phaseshift (-0.2), and the period (2) were used in this experiment. 
Stimulus Project Belief Propagation 
Experiment Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 20 
Interactions per Step 300 
# Stimulus Projects 3 (steps 1, 3, 5) 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [48] 
Initial Agent Beliefs All Neutral (0) 
Table 4.33 – Stimulus Project Belief Propagation Experiment Description 
 Figure 4.13 shows the beliefs of the agents in the network at the end of the 20-step game.  
We notice the drastic difference the use of three stimulus projects has had on the diffusion of 
beliefs in the network as the mean network belief increased from neutral (0) at the start of the 
game to slightly in favor of the United States (0.0744) by the end of the game.  We conducted 
the same experiment as described in Table 4.33 with the exception that no stimulus projects 
occurred during the game.  By doing so, we can compare the payoffs and end-game network 
diagrams to see the impact stimulus projects can have on the diffusion of beliefs.   
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Figure 4.13 – Ending Network Diagram: Stimulus Project Belief Propagation Example 
Figure 4.14 shows the end-game network diagram for the experiment where no stimulus 
projects were used by the U.S. agent under the same conditions as the previous experiment.  
Upon visual comparison of Figures 4.13 and 4.14 we observe the beneficial impact that stimulus 
projects can have on the beliefs of the mutable agents in the network. 
 
Figure 4.14 – Ending Network Diagram: No Stimulus Project Example 
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 Although the end-game network beliefs for the experiment using the stimulus projects 
provides a better payoff for the U.S. agent than when no stimulus projects are used, we would 
also like to observe a plot comparison of the payoffs over time throughout the experiment.  More 
specifically, we would like to determine if the use of stimulus projects can result in long-lasting 
‘shocks’ in the beliefs of the agents in the network, or if rather, such belief ‘shocks’ are 
temporary as the beliefs will eventually return to prior values.  Figure 4.15 shows the plot of the 
relative ‘mean belief’ payoff for the U.S. agent throughout the course of the 20-step game for 
both experiments.  Thus, we see how game-changing the use of stimulus projects can be on the 
propagation of beliefs as the belief ‘shocks’ resulted in long-lasting changes in the mean belief of 
the mutable agents in the network. 
 
Figure 4.15 – Relative Payoff Comparison over Time: Stimulus vs. No Stimulus 
The reason why the belief shocks from the stimulus projects are long-lasting relates to the 
characteristics of the threshold model, and specifically the peer pressure aspect of the model, 
which makes it difficult to change an individual’s belief away from the beliefs of the individual’s 
neighbors.  Because a stimulus project causes a belief shock to an agent and all of his 
neighboring adjacency connections (excluding stubborn agents), the resulting beliefs can be 
long-lasting since the shock simultaneously affects a cluster of neighboring agents.  For instance, 
if all agents who are affected by the stimulus project have the same belief prior to the stimulus 
project, then they will all increase (or decrease) their beliefs by the same value, and subsequently 
have a tendency to remain at the new belief due to the peer pressure aspect of the threshold 
model. 
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Strategic Planning with Limited Resources 
A typical question which may arise by the U.S. military is:  “Given we have limited 
resources to fund stimulus projects, when should we use the projects in order to produce the 
greatest benefit toward our cause?”  More specifically, one may wonder whether it is better to 
spread out the use of stimulus projects over time, or rather concentrate their use during a certain 
time interval.  Moreover, the decision on when to use a stimulus project may depend on the 
current landscape of the network (i.e. current beliefs of the mutable agents).  Thus, there could be 
instances where it is more advantageous to use a stimulus project sooner rather than later, and 
vice versa.  Below we explore scenarios involving limited resources and subsequently provide 
general rules for when stimulus projects should be used during the two-player game. 
Question 1:  Should the U.S. agent use stimulus projects sooner rather than later, vice versa, or 
perhaps not at all? 
 The first set of experiments is designed to determine the general characteristics of 
networks, specifically in relation to the beliefs of the agents, which suggest a trend for when to 
use stimulus projects in the context of Question 1.  The default values for the amplitude of each 
stimulus project and the period (2) were used in this experiment set, while the phaseshift was set 
to -0.1.  The details of the experiments are shown below: 
Experiment Set 1 Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 10 
Interactions per Step 300 
# Stimulus Projects 
1 (either step 1 or step 9) 
or None 
Stimulus Project Type School 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [70] 
Initial Agent Beliefs 
Exp 1.  Village Mix 1 
Exp 2.  Village Mix 2 
Exp 3.  All Neutral (0) 
Exp 4.  All +0.4 
Exp 5.  All -0.4 
Exp 6.  Village Mix 6 
Table 4.34 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 1 Description 
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For each of the six experiments, there were three different cases tested concerning the 
usage of stimulus projects.  The description of the three cases is seen in the table below. 
Experiment Set 1 Case Description 
Case A 1 stimulus project (step 1) 
Case B 1 stimulus project (step 9) 
Case C No stimulus project 
Table 4.35 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 1 Case Description 
 We compare the ‘mean belief’ payoff function for the U.S. at the end of the game as well 
as the average ‘mean belief’ payoff during the course of the game (found by averaging the ‘mean 
belief’ payoff at the end of each step in the 10-step game).  Table 4.36 shows the results for each 
of the six experiments, where the case for each experiment with the highest payoff is highlighted. 
 
End Absolute 
Payoff 
End Relative 
Payoff 
Average Absolute 
Payoff 
Average Relative 
Payoff 
Exp 1A 0.0027 0.0164 0.0032 0.0169 
Exp 1B 0.0230 0.0367 0.0062 0.0199 
Exp 1C 0.0159 0.0296 0.0043 0.0180 
Exp 2A 0.0083 0.0261 0.0075 0.0253 
Exp 2B 0.0422 0.0600 0.0119 0.0297 
Exp 2C 0.0321 0.0499 0.0097 0.0275 
Exp 3A 0.0149 0.0149 0.0120 0.0120 
Exp 3B 0.0086 0.0086 0.0016 0.0016 
Exp 3C -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0005 
Exp 4A 0.4184 0.0184 0.4184 0.0184 
Exp 4B 0.3984 -0.0016 0.3913 -0.0087 
Exp 4C 0.3732 -0.0268 0.3860 -0.0140 
Exp 5C -0.3694 0.0306 -0.3771 0.0229 
Exp 5C -0.3753 0.0247 -0.3818 0.0182 
Exp 5C -0.3718 0.0282 -0.3807 0.0193 
Exp 6C -0.1676 0.0345 -0.1833 0.0188 
Exp 6C -0.1573 0.0447 -0.1764 0.0257 
Exp 6C -0.1550 0.0470 -0.1761 0.0260 
Table 4.36 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 1Payoff Table 
 The results of these experiments in conjunction with consistent observations from other 
experiments analyzing the use of stimulus projects have led us to propose the general guidelines 
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(see below) concerning the timing/use of stimulus projects during the two-player game if 
resources are limited to the U.S. agent. 
Guidelines for answering Question 1 
 If the network has completely (or semi) homogenous initial agent beliefs 
o If homogenously positive (or at least above the phaseshift value):   
 Empirical evidence suggests it is better to conduct stimulus projects as soon as 
possible during the game 
o If homogenously negative (or at least below the phaseshift value): 
 Empirical evidence suggests it is better to conduct stimulus projects as soon as 
possible during the game or perhaps not at all 
 If the network has many mixed beliefs, clustered homogenously by village 
 Empirical evidence shows that it is better to wait until later in the game to use 
stimulus projects once the beliefs have ‘settled down’  
Experiments 1 and 2 show that the U.S. agent will attain the highest mean belief payoff 
(both the average payoff over time and the end-game payoff) if the stimulus project is used 
toward the end of the game, rather than the beginning.  The initial network beliefs of experiments 
1 and 2 are Village Mix 1 and Village Mix 2, respectively, which both contain beliefs that are 
mixed and clustered homogenously by village.  Thus, the findings from experiments 1 and 2 
coincide with the guideline that the U.S. agent should wait until later in the game to use a 
stimulus project given the initial network beliefs are mixed and clustered homogenously by 
village.  Experiments 3, 4, and 5 contain initial network beliefs of all neutral (0), all +0.4, and all 
-0.4, respectively.  Based on the guidelines presented above, we expect that the U.S. agent will 
obtain a higher payoff if the stimulus project is used at the beginning of the game rather than 
towards the end of the game.  As expected, we find that the highest mean belief payoff for the 
U.S. agent occurs when the stimulus project is used during step 1 of the 10-step game.  One key 
observation to point out, however, is that a higher payoff is obtained for the U.S. agent in 
experiment 5 when no stimulus project is used, rather than the stimulus project being used at the 
end of the game during step 9.  This finding shows that for networks which are mostly (or 
completely) anti-US in their initial agent beliefs that the use of stimulus projects may actual do 
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more harm than good for the U.S. payoff.  Experiment 6 is a good example of this finding, as the 
initial network is mostly anti-US in their sentiments, and empirical evidence shows us that the 
best payoff for the U.S. agent occurs when no stimulus project is used during the game. 
Question 2:  Should the U.S. agent spread out the use of stimulus projects, or rather concentrate 
their use consecutively during a specific time period? 
 Another realistic question which may arise for the U.S. player is: “Given the use of 
stimulus projects will improve my payoff during the game, should the projects be spread out 
during the game or should I instead concentrate their use during a specific time interval?”  We 
present the experiment and case descriptions which analyzes this question in the tables shown 
below. 
Experiment Set 2 Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 10 
# Steps 20 
Interactions per Step 300 
# Stimulus Projects 5 
Stimulus Project Type School 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [1] 
Initial Agent Beliefs All Neutral (0) 
Table 4.37 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 2 Description 
Experiment Set 2 Case Description 
Exp A 
5 stimulus projects (concentrated—used 
during steps 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9) 
Exp B 
5 stimulus projects (concentrated—used 
during steps 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) 
Exp C 
5 stimulus projects (spread out—used 
during steps 1, 5, 9, 13, and 17) 
Table 4.38 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 2 Case Description 
 Similar to previous experiment set, we compare the ‘mean belief’ payoff for the U.S. 
agent at both the end of the two-player game as well as the average ‘mean belief’ payoff during 
the course of the game.  The results of this experiment are presented in Table 4.39 where we 
highlight the experiment case which yields the highest payoff for the U.S. agent.   
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End Absolute 
Payoff 
End Relative 
Payoff 
Average Absolute 
Payoff 
Average Relative 
Payoff 
Exp A 0.1440 0.1440 0.0954 0.0954 
Exp B 0.1005 0.1005 0.0241 0.0241 
Exp C 0.0535 0.0535 0.0336 0.0336 
Table 4.39 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 2 Payoff Table 
 Upon viewing the payoff table above as well as the ‘mean belief’ payoff plots of the three 
cases in Figure 4.16 below, we observe the noticeable advantage the U.S. agent obtains in ‘mean 
belief’ payoff when the stimulus projects are used consecutively, rather than spread out evenly 
over the course of the entire game.   
Exp A                          Exp B 
 
Exp C 
 
Figure 4.16 – Strategic Planning with Limited Resources: Experiment Set 2 Payoff Plots 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Step #
[0.1440]
M
e
a
n
 N
e
tw
o
rk
 B
e
li
e
f
Mean Network Belief After Step i
20 Step Game, where E[Interactions per Step] = 300
 
 
Absolute Mean Belief
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Step #
[0.1005]
M
e
a
n
 N
e
tw
o
rk
 B
e
li
e
f
Mean Network Belief After Step i
20 Step Game, where E[Interactions per Step] = 300
 
 
Absolute Mean Belief
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Step #
[0.0535]
M
e
a
n
 N
e
tw
o
rk
 B
e
li
e
f
Mean Network Belief After Step i
20 Step Game, where E[Interactions per Step] = 300
 
 
Absolute Mean Belief
123 
 
Both cases where the stimulus projects are used consecutively (either at the beginning or 
end of the game) yields a higher payoff than spreading out the use of the projects over the course 
of the entire game.  Moreover, the highest payoff occurs when the stimulus projects are 
concentrated at the beginning of the game.  Empirical evidence, including the results of this 
experiment, supports the notion that stimulus projects can have a compounding effect in payoff 
gains when they are used in a consecutive manner which results in higher payoffs than 
distributing the stimulus projects evenly over time.  Thus, given the U.S. agent has limited 
resources to devote to stimulus projects, we recommend the projects be used in a consecutive 
manner during the game in order to produce the greatest benefit for the U.S. cause. 
4.3.2 Assassinations 
While the U.S. agent has additional actions, such as stimulus projects, which can affect 
belief propagation in the network, the Taliban agent is also given the ability to target mutable 
agents for assassinations in order instill negative ‘belief shocks’ in the network.  We provide a 
description of the Taliban agent’s ability to carry out assassinations below: 
Description 
We implement the ability for the Taliban agent to conduct assassinations during the two-
player game as follows: 
 The number of assassination s that will occur during the game is predetermined. 
 A limit of one assassination can occur per TB step during the game. 
 No assassinations may occur during a U.S. step. 
 Given the predetermined number of assassinations set to occur during the game, 
we either randomly or selectively choose the TB steps for which assassinations 
will occur. 
 Given an assassination is set to occur during a TB step, the agent that is 
assassinated is an agent that is presently communicating with the U.S. agent (i.e. 
is a chosen strategy by the U.S. agent).  The reason for this implementation is that 
the Taliban is more likely to assassinate those people who show favor to the U.S. 
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cause, and thus, someone who is communicating with the U.S. is a likely target 
for an assassination. 
 The effect of the assassination: 
o The influence level of the assassinated agent drops by one level. For 
instance, if the agent was previously forceful+ he is now forceful, and if 
the agent was previously forceful he is now regular.  This is to mimic the 
effect that the heir to the position will most likely be the agent’s son and is 
less likely to be as influential as the father.  Thus, assassinated agents are 
not removed from the network, but rather replaced by the next of kin. 
o The influence level of the agent will return to the previous level before the 
assassination occurred at the conclusion of the current step in the game. 
o All agents which are adjacent to the agent that is assassinated (as well as 
the next of kin replacing the assassinated agent) will undergo a negative 
‘belief shock’ whereby the assassination will decrease their current beliefs 
based on their influence level as described below: 
DEFINTION: 
We define the set of mutable agents who receive a negative belief shock from an assassination by 
the TB agent that occurs during step k of the two-player game as: 
                                                                   
The belief of agent   is updated due to the assassination occurring during step k and time t as 
follows: 
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Regular agents are the least influential agents in the network, and therefore, more likely 
to follow or comply in their opinions due to fear tactics imposed by the use (or threat) of an 
assassination.  We reason that the more influential an agent is, the less likely they are to succumb 
to the threat or use of an assassination.  Thus, we reflect this notion by decreasing the negative 
belief shock that results from an assassination as the influence level of the affected agent 
increases. 
Belief Propagation with Assassinations 
We wish to explore how the use of assassinations can affect the dissemination of beliefs 
in the network during the course of the two-player game.  In Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. 
military commanders may be interested in determining how the beliefs of the local populace 
within a village reacts to the news that a leader in their village was assassinated by the Taliban 
for speaking with and showing favor to the United States.  Would the fear of subsequent 
assassination attempts detrimentally affect the progress the U.S. has made with the opinions of 
the people in a targeted village?  After conducting various experiments which examine how 
assassinations affect the propagation of beliefs in the network we have observed the following: 
OBSERVATION 
  Taliban assassinations have the ability to cause long-lasting changes in the beliefs of 
mutable agents in the network and can subsequently be referred to as game-changing actions 
available to the TB agent. 
Example 
 We present an example below which shows how the use of assassinations can result in 
long-lasting negative ‘shocks’ to the beliefs of the agents in the network and leads to an 
advantageous payoff for the Taliban agent.  These long-lasting ‘shocks’ are analogous to the 
long-lasting shocks brought on by the use of stimulus projects by the U.S. agent, with the 
exception that the shocks from assassinations are intended to promote more favorable beliefs for 
the Taliban cause.  For the experiment presented below, the initial belief of all mutable agents in 
the network is neutral, and the Taliban agent carries out three assassinations during the beginning 
of the 20-step game—steps 2, 4 and 6.  Moreover, the default value for the belief shock from an 
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assassination (-0.1) was used during the experiment.  Table 4.40 provides further details about 
the parameters of the experiment. 
Assassination Belief Propagation 
Experiment Description 
Network Large (73 agents) 
# Realizations 30 
# Steps 20 
Interactions per Step 300 
# Stimulus Projects 3 (steps 2, 4, 6) 
Connections per Player (z) 1 
Initial, Fixed Strategy TB [48] 
Initial Agent Beliefs All Neutral (0) 
Table 4.40 – Assassination Belief Propagation Experiment Description 
Figure 4.17 shows the beliefs of the agents in the network at the end of the 20-step game.  
During the experiment, the three agents which were assassinated were agents 49 (step 2), 48 
(step 4), and 54 (step 6). 
 
Figure 4.17 – Ending Network Diagram: Assassination Belief Propagation Example 
 In order to observe the effect that the assassinations had on the evolution of beliefs in the 
network over time, we conducted the same experiment as described in Table 4.40 with the 
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exception that no assassinations occurred during the game.  By doing so, we can compare the 
payoffs and end-game network diagrams to see the impact assassinations can have on the 
diffusion of beliefs.  Figure 4.18 shows the end-game network diagram for the experiment where 
no assassinations were used by the TB agent. 
 
Figure 4.18 – Ending Network Diagram: No Assassination Project Example 
  
Although the end-game network beliefs for the experiment using the three assassinations 
yields a better payoff for the Taliban agent than when no assassinations were used, we would 
also like to observe a plot comparison of the payoffs over time throughout the experiment.  More 
specifically, we would like to determine if the use of assassinations can result in long-lasting 
‘shocks’ in the beliefs of the agents in the network, or if rather, such belief ‘shocks’ are 
temporary as the beliefs will eventually return to prior values.  Figure 4.19 shows the plot of the 
relative ‘mean belief’ payoff for the U.S. agent (the payoff for the Taliban agent is simply the 
negative value of the U.S. agent’s payoff since this is a zero-sum game) throughout the course of 
the 20-step game for both experiments.  Thus, we see how game-changing the use of 
assassinations can be on the propagation of beliefs as the negative belief ‘shocks’ resulted in 
long-lasting changes in the mean belief of the mutable agents in the network. 
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Figure 4.19 – Relative Payoff Comparison over Time: Assassination vs. No Assassination 
Much like the long-lasting shocks brought upon the beliefs in the network due to stimulus 
projects, the reason why the belief shocks from the assassinations are long-lasting relates to the 
characteristics of the threshold model, and specifically the peer pressure aspect of the model, 
which makes it difficult to change an individual’s belief away from the beliefs of the individual’s 
neighbors.  Because an assassination causes a belief shock to the targeted agent and all of his 
neighboring adjacency connections (excluding stubborn agents) as well as temporarily degrades 
the level of influence of the assassinated agent by one level, the resulting beliefs can be long-
lasting since the shock simultaneously affects a cluster of neighboring agents.  Thus, once the 
agents who are affected by the assassination decrease their belief, they will subsequently have a 
tendency to remain at the new belief due to the peer pressure aspect of the threshold model. 
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4.4 Summary of Experiments 
The formulation of the proposed threshold model and subsequent experimentation and 
analysis of the dynamic, two-player game on the network model have resulted in very interesting 
and surprising conclusions, such as: 
 The long-term beliefs of the mutable agents in the network are dependent on the 
initial beliefs, which is due to the peer pressure aspect of the threshold model 
which affects the belief exchanges during pairwise interactions. 
 The two-player game operates in a transient, “chess game” setting which allows 
for the players to analyze their opponent’s strategy as well as the current state of 
the network and then subsequently make dynamic changes in their strategies in 
order to improve their payoffs. 
 SURPISING RESULT:  The population-focused actions (stimulus projects and 
assassinations) introduced in Section 4.3 cause long-lasting changes in the beliefs 
of mutable agents in the network and can subsequently be deemed as game-
changing actions available to the players.  This conclusion gives credibility to the 
notion that “actions speak louder than words” when trying to influence the 
opinions of others! 
 Finally, we implemented the ability to penalize the payoffs for identical strategies 
among opposing stubborn agents (U.S. and Taliban) in order to disincentivize 
their appeal during the two-player game, which thus creates a more realistic 
setting for the game.  However, as experiments have shown, the   penalty factor 
is not always necessary to prevent identical strategies as stubborn agents ideally 
target different mutable agents of opposite beliefs. 
Moreover, in Section 4.1 we discussed the characteristics of strategies chosen by the 
players during the dynamic, two-player game on the proposed threshold model in the transient 
setting.  Based on empirical evidence, we presented four key observations: 
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1. Stubborn agents target influential agents of opposite belief. 
2. In the transient setting, stubborn agents target influential agents who have many 
neighbors (large     ) of lesser influence level, but whose neighbors live in small 
neighborhoods (small     ). 
3. For villages containing more than one influential leader of similar beliefs, 
stubborn agents should sequentially target some, or all, of those village leaders. 
4. Stubborn agents target influential agents with low threshold values who also have 
neighbors with low threshold values. 
We also showed how different payoff functions influence the strategies targeted by the players, 
as well as the sensitivity of the strategies to other model parameters, such as the interaction-type 
probabilities (          values), the initial strategy chosen by a stubborn agent during step 0 of 
the game, and the imposed penalty for restricting identical strategies ( ).  We showed that the 
threshold model is fairly robust to changes in the      and   values, which is important because 
our estimates of these values do not need to be highly accurate.  Moreover, we showed that the 
strategies chosen by the players to maximize their payoffs are sensitive to the specific   
parameter as well as the initial strategy chosen by a stubborn agent during step.  Additionally, the 
penalty for limiting identical strategies ( ) is not always necessary, as stubborn agents find 
agents of opposite belief as desirable strategies, and thus, networks representing a wide array of 
different agent beliefs enable stubborn agents to focus their strategy selection on influencing 
different agents. 
 Later, in Section 4.2, we analyzed the run time performance of three methods used to find 
strategies during the two-player game:  exhaustive enumeration, ‘Selective Search’, and 
‘Sequential Search’.  Scenarios in which the stubborn agents have     connections during the 
game can be computationally burdensome for exhaustive enumeration and even ‘Selective 
Search’.  However, the ‘Sequential Search’ greedy algorithm scales extremely well with 
increasing complexity without tremendously sacrificing the quality of the solutions compared to 
exhaustive enumeration and ‘Selective Search’. 
 Finally, Section 4.3 introduced population-focused actions—stimulus projects and 
assassinations—which can be used by the US and TB agents, respectively, to further affect the 
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propagation of beliefs during the two-player game.  The belief shocks which occurred as a result 
of the stimulus projects and assassinations affected the beliefs of a neighborhood of mutable 
agents.  Thus, due to the nature of the peer pressure influence which is built into the threshold 
model, these population-focused actions surprisingly resulted in long-lasting changes in the 
beliefs of the mutable agents in the network.  Subsequently, this astounding result gives credence 
to the saying that “actions speak louder than words” when attempting to influence the opinions 
of other people! 
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5 Future Work Recommendations 
In this chapter we explore several interesting topics as enhancements to the current peer-
influence, social network and two-player game.  First, we discuss the possibility of considering a 
dynamic network which evolves over time.  Next, we discuss modifying the two-player game as 
an imperfect information game whereby opposing players are limited in the information they 
know about each other’s strategies, the beliefs and influence levels of the agents in the network, 
and/or when their opponents will update their strategies.  Moreover, we discuss the implications 
of ‘tipping points’ in the two-player game, whereby future research could provide better insights 
into the underlying parameters which factor into the strategy choices made by the players.  Later, 
we suggest the introduction of additional population-focused actions which affect belief 
propagation, such as using a surge of troops to improve security in a village, spreading 
propaganda, or organizing meetings with the populace.  Finally, we introduce the concept of 
using iterated reasoning in order to predict opponent strategies with the objective of finding 
better strategies for the stubborn agents in the two-player game.     
5.1 Dynamic Networks 
During the modeling approach and implementation of the two-player game, we made the 
assumption of a static (fixed) network whereby the location of all agents and their adjacency 
connections were known and constant.  However, in a realistic setting, in which the analysis of 
the network occurs for an extended period of time, this assumption may no longer be valid as the 
social network evolves over time with respect to the number of agents, the adjacency 
connections between agents, and the influence level of the agents.  Thus, modifying the social 
network to incorporate the idea of a dynamic network that can change during the course of the 
two-player game unveils a new area of interesting analysis concerning this work.   
Moreover, although the primary focus of this research was on analyzing the belief 
diffusion and characteristics of strategies chosen by the stubborn agents on a realistic Pashtun 
network, future work on a wide variety of different network structures could provide additional 
insights into the characteristics of strategies chosen by the stubborn agents during the two-player 
game.  While different network types, such as line, ring (circle), or star, may not be realistic 
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depictions of societal networks, their unique topologies may result in notable differences in the 
behavior of the stubborn agents when choosing strategies in order to maximize their payoffs 
during the game. 
5.2 Imperfect Information Games 
The two-player game implementation assumes a symmetric, perfect information game 
whereby both players know each other’s strategies, the exact beliefs and levels of influence of all 
agents in the network, as well as when each player will update their strategies.  These 
assumptions are not valid in a realistic setting whereby players do not necessarily know who 
their opponents are trying to influence, let alone when their opponents will switch their strategies 
to targeting new agents.  Moreover, having accurate estimates of the beliefs of all agents in the 
network and their influence levels at any given time is a difficult task as these values may be 
subject to change on a regular basis. 
 Thus, future work could analyze the two-player game as an imperfect information game 
whereby we limit a player’s knowledge about their opponent’s strategy, the beliefs and influence 
level of the agents in the network, and/or the times during the game when the opponent will 
update their strategy.  By reformulating the game as such, players would attempt to make 
educated guesses about their opponent’s strategy through observation methods, such as viewing 
the percentage change in agent beliefs over time.  Therefore, as the network beliefs evolve over 
the course of the game, a player would continually update their confidence in the strategy they 
believe their opponent has chosen.  Moreover, if a player is restricted in their knowledge of the 
beliefs of particular agents in the network, they may consider inferring their beliefs by looking at 
the beliefs of their neighboring agents. 
5.3 Tipping Points 
In Chapter 4 we observed how different parameters weigh into the decisions made by 
stubborn agents on choosing their targeting strategies.  The topology of the network (the number 
of agents, their level of influence, and their connectivity), the threshold values, and the current 
beliefs of the agents all factor into the quality of strategies chosen by the players to maximize 
their payoffs.  However, the topic of tipping points presents an interesting area for future 
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research with the ultimate aim at producing generalized relationships (formulas) between the 
various parameters which affect the strategies chosen by the stubborn agents.  For instance, we 
present the following example below which gives insight into the relationship between the 
threshold values and beliefs of the agents.  We wish to determine the ‘tipping point’ at which a 
stubborn agent will change his strategy based on changes in threshold values and agent beliefs. 
Example 
 The network diagram in Figure 5.1 contains three symmetric villages, each containing 1 
forceful+ agent, 3 forceful agents, and 4 regular agents.  During the two-player game on this 
network, given the initial TB strategy (agent 4), the default threshold values, and ‘mean belief’ 
payoff function, the U.S. agent’s first strategy selection (step 1) for maximizing his payoff 100 
interactions into the future will be to target Village 3 (specifically agent 3) due to the high payoff 
obtained by targeting a village of opposite belief (-0.5).  However, we wish to determine the 
‘tipping point’ for the threshold values of the forceful+ and forceful agents in Village 3 which 
would cause the US agent to instead target Village 2 during step 1.  There is an inherent tradeoff 
between the threshold values and the beliefs of agents since agents of opposite belief yield higher 
payoffs for stubborn agents, while agents with higher threshold values are harder to influence 
and subsequently result in lower payoffs. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Tipping Point: Network Diagram 
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 For this simple experiment set, we conduct five experiments where the beliefs of all 
agents in Village 2 differ between experiments ranging from 0 to -0.4, while the beliefs of all 
agents in Villages 1 and 3 remain the same (+0.5 and -0.5, respectively).  The network diagram 
in Figure 5.1 shows the initial network for experiment case #5.  We subsequently determine at 
which point (i.e. tipping point) the U.S. agent will change his strategy during step 1 from 
targeting Village 3 to Village 2 by increasing the threshold values of the forceful+ and forceful 
agents in Village 3 until this change in strategy occurs.  Table 5.1 details the experiment set and 
shows the resulting threshold value tipping points for the five experiment cases. 
   
 
Threshold Tipping Point of Village 3 Leaders 
 
Village 1 
Belief 
Village 2 
Belief 
Village 3 
Belief 
US Agent Targets Village 
3 for all Threshold Values 
Between: 
US Agent Targets Village 
2 for all Threshold Values 
Between: 
Case #1: +0.5 -0.4 -0.5 [0, 0.7661] [0.7662, 1] 
Case #2: +0.5 -0.3 -0.5 [0 ,0.7831] [0.7832, 1] 
Case #3: +0.5 -0.2 -0.5 [0, 0.7892] [0.7893, 1] 
Case #4: +0.5 -0.1 -0.5 [0, 0.8061] [0.8062, 1] 
Case #5: +0.5 0 -0.5 [0, 0.8320] [0.8321, 1] 
Table 5.1 – Tipping Point: Results 
 Moreover, Figure 5.2 shows the linear relationship which exists for the tipping points 
between the threshold values and beliefs of the agents for the five experiment cases.  Thus, we 
conclude that the strategies chosen (and subsequent payoffs received) by a stubborn agent 
depend linearly on changes in threshold values and the beliefs of the agents in the network.  
Hopefully, future research into this topic would produce a generalized relationship between all 
interacting variables which affect the strategies that are chosen by the stubborn agents. 
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Figure 5.2 – Tipping Point: Linear Relationship Plot 
 
5.4 Applying Iterated Reasoning to Predict Opponent Strategies 
During the course of the dynamic, two-player game, the two stubborn agents have perfect 
information about the current state of the network, including their opponent’s strategy.  Although 
the game operates in the transient setting with continual updates in strategies for both players, the 
implementation of a smarter algorithm which uses iterated reasoning to predict opponent 
strategies would be useful.  Currently, in the two-player game, the players select the best 
strategies given the current state of the network and their opponent’s current strategy, without 
looking ahead into the future to predict what the opponent’s strategies may be in response to 
their newly updated strategies.  Much like in the game of chess, whereby players ideally want to 
‘checkmate’ their opponent as a result of analyzing the game several moves into the future in 
order to make the best possible move, the stubborn agents in the two-player game would be 
better served in their strategy selections if they applied the same iterated reasoning to predict 
their opponent’s strategies. 
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5.5 Additional Population-Focused Actions Which Affect Belief 
Propagation 
In Section 4.3 we introduced population-focused actions (stimulus projects and 
assassinations) which gave the US agent and TB agent additional capabilities for affecting the 
beliefs in the network, besides choosing connection strategies.  Experiments demonstrated that 
the belief shocks resulting from these population-focused actions produced long-lasting changes 
on the beliefs of the agents in the network.  However, besides pairwise interactions (all agents in 
the network), stimulus projects (US agent), and assassinations (TB agent), no other actions are 
available to the agents in order to impact the diffusion of beliefs in the network.  This presents an 
area for future research by enhancing the model to allow for even more population-focused 
actions which can affect the propagation of beliefs.  The implementation of the following 
strategy options could provide valuable insights into how other actions affect the attitudes of the 
agents in the network: 
 Surge of Troops:  If the counterinsurgents significantly increase the security of a 
particular village or district by increasing the number of troops, how will this impact the 
attitudes of the agents in the network? 
 Propaganda:  How will propaganda—posters, pamphlets, radio, internet, loud speakers, 
etc.—supporting either the insurgents or counterinsurgents affect agent beliefs? 
 Meetings and Negotiations:  Can organized village meetings or negotiations prove as 
valuable options for the insurgents or counterinsurgents in achieving significant gains in 
popular support of the people? 
The strategy options presented above as well as many others could be formulated in the current 
model for use by the agents during the two-player game.  We have already seen the surprising 
ability for stimulus projects and assassinations to produce long-lasting changes in the network 
beliefs, and it would be of further interest in determining the affects of additional population-
focused actions on the network attitudes. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we summarize the work presented in this thesis and give conclusions 
obtained through experiments and analysis of the proposed threshold model and dynamic, two-
player game.  This thesis considered the problem of finding the best strategies for maximally 
influencing the beliefs of individuals in social networks toward supporting the counterinsurgency 
efforts of the United States in Afghanistan. 
In Chapter 2 we described the nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and the 
inherent struggle between both sides for the popular support of the people.  The U.S. military has 
limited resources and personnel, and therefore, critical decisions must be made by ground forces 
on whom to selectively target with the end goal of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the most 
people.  Because the success of any counterinsurgency ultimately hinges on the ability to win the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the populace, this thesis focused on the extremely difficult task of 
determining which individuals to engage through nonlethal means with the objective of winning 
the most support of the populace. 
In Chapter 3 we described the formulation of a proposed threshold model which is a 
stochastic, pairwise-interaction model with mutable agents whose beliefs can change and with 
immutable (stubborn) agents whose beliefs do not change.  The U.S. military forces and Taliban 
insurgents are represented by a stubborn agent (US and TB agent), and they have opposite, 
immutable beliefs of +0.5 and -0.5, respectively.  We introduced a dynamic, two-player game 
whereby each player controls a predetermined number of connections from their respective 
stubborn agent to mutable agents in the network, and the objective of the game for each player is 
to maximize their respective payoff function.  Two payoff functions (‘mean belief’ and ‘number 
of agents won’) are defined for the players.  The two-player game operates in a transient, “chess 
game” setting which allows for the players to analyze their opponent’s strategy as well as the 
current state of the network and then subsequently make dynamic changes in their strategies in 
order to improve their payoffs.  Furthermore, we defined how the players locate strategies during 
the game and introduced two heuristic methods, the ‘Selective Search’ Heuristic and the 
‘Sequential Search’ Greedy Algorithm which are used to significantly reduce the run time 
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needed to find solutions for complex problems where the use of exhaustive enumeration 
becomes too cumbersome. 
In Chapter 4 we presented the results and analysis of the proposed threshold model and 
dynamic, two-player game.  The dynamic, two player game allows players to update their 
strategies in the transient setting which creates a more realistic game environment than previous 
modeling approaches [8, 13].  Furthermore, we showed that the long-term beliefs of the mutable 
agents in the network are dependent on the initial beliefs, which is due to the peer pressure aspect 
of the threshold model which affects the belief exchanges during pairwise interactions.  The 
population-focused actions (stimulus projects and assassinations) introduced in Section 4.3 cause 
long-lasting changes in the beliefs of mutable agents in the network and can subsequently be 
deemed as game-changing actions available to the players.  This conclusion gives credibility to 
the notion that “actions speak louder than words” when trying to influence the opinions of 
others!  Even though we implemented the ability to penalize the payoffs for identical strategies 
among opposing stubborn agents (U.S. and Taliban) in order to create a more realistic setting for 
the game, we showed that the   penalty factor is not always necessary to prevent identical 
strategies as stubborn agents are incentivized on their own to target different mutable agents of 
opposite beliefs. 
Moreover, in Section 4.1 we discussed the characteristics of strategies chosen by the 
players during the dynamic, two-player game on the proposed threshold model in the transient 
setting.  Based on empirical evidence, we presented four key observations: 
1. Stubborn agents target influential agents of opposite belief. 
2. In the transient setting, stubborn agents target influential agents who have many 
neighbors (large     ) of lesser influence level, but whose neighbors live in small 
neighborhoods (small     ). 
3. For villages containing more than one influential leader of similar beliefs, 
stubborn agents should sequentially target some, or all, of those village leaders. 
4. Stubborn agents target influential agents with low threshold values who also have 
neighbors with low threshold values. 
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We also showed how different payoff functions influence the strategies targeted by the 
players, as well as the sensitivity of the strategies to other model parameters, such as the 
interaction-type probabilities (          values), the initial strategy chosen by a stubborn agent 
during step 0 of the game, and the imposed penalty for restricting identical strategies ( ).  We 
demonstrated that the threshold model is fairly robust to changes in the      and   values, which 
is important because our estimates of these values do not need to be highly accurate.  Moreover, 
we showed that the strategies chosen by the players to maximize their payoffs are sensitive to the 
specific   parameter as well as the initial strategy chosen by a stubborn agent during step.  
Additionally, the penalty for limiting identical strategies ( ) is not always necessary, as stubborn 
agents find agents of opposite belief as desirable strategies, and thus, networks representing a 
wide array of different agent beliefs enable stubborn agents to focus their strategy selection on 
influencing different agents. 
 Later, in Section 4.2, we analyzed the run time performance of three methods used to find 
strategies during the two-player game:  exhaustive enumeration, ‘Selective Search’, and 
‘Sequential Search’.  Scenarios in which the stubborn agents have     connections during the 
game can be computationally burdensome for exhaustive enumeration and even ‘Selective 
Search’.  However, the ‘Sequential Search’ greedy algorithm scales extremely well with 
increasing complexity without tremendously sacrificing the quality of the solutions compared to 
exhaustive enumeration and ‘Selective Search’. 
 In Section 4.3 we introduced population-focused actions—stimulus projects and 
assassinations—which can be used by the US and TB agents, respectively, to further affect the 
propagation of beliefs during the two-player game.  The belief shocks which occurred as a result 
of the stimulus projects and assassinations affected the beliefs of a neighborhood of mutable 
agents.  Thus, due to the nature of the peer pressure influence which is built into the threshold 
model, these population-focused actions surprisingly resulted in long-lasting changes in the 
beliefs of the mutable agents in the network.  Subsequently, this astounding result gives credence 
to the saying that “actions speak louder than words” when attempting to influence the opinions 
of other people! 
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 Finally, in Chapter 5, we identified interesting areas for future research.  The five areas 
for future research were: (1) dynamic networks, (2) imperfect information games, (3) tipping 
points, (4) additional population-focused actions which affect belief propagation, and (5) 
applying iterated reasoning to predict opponent strategies.  These five areas, among others, offer 
new opportunities to enhance the current modeling approach and will provide new insights into 
the opinion dynamics of the two-player game. 
This thesis focused on the extremely difficult task of determining which individuals to 
engage through nonlethal means in order to gain the most support of the populace during 
counterinsurgency efforts.  Although the task of winning the most popular support during 
counterinsurgency efforts is tremendously difficult and complex due to the multitude of variables 
that need to be considered at any given time, the modeling formulation and game theoretic 
approach provides a systematic method for the U.S. military to use in their evaluation of 
potential nonlethal targeting strategies.  Thus, rather than solely relying on intuition and limited 
intelligence, military commanders are capable of assigning quantitative values to their list of 
high priority nonlethal targets based on the predicted effects on the opinions of the populace.  
Hopefully, the decision methods, analysis, and insights presented in this thesis will serve as an 
important step towards efficiently and effectively winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
population in Afghanistan as well as future areas of concern for the United States military. 
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Appendix A:  Variable Notation and Definitions 
Notation Description 
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                                              (since agents cannot interact with themselves)  
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Appendix B:  Experimental Data and Results 
Agent 
(Node) 
1.  All 
Neutral 
2.  Village 
Mix 0 
3.  Village 
Mix 1 
4.  Village 
Mix 2 
5.  Village 
Mix 3 
6.  Village 
Mix 4 
7.  Village 
Mix 5 
8.  Village 
Mix 6 
9.  All 
Random 
1 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3680 
2 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3873 
3 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1430 
4 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0959 
5 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.0801 
6 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.4745 
7 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1469 
8 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2324 
9 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0924 
10 0 0 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.1268 
11 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1698 
12 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3033 
13 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.3440 
14 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.2122 
15 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.2767 
16 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.2781 
17 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1173 
18 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.2890 
19 0 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.0842 
20 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.1861 
21 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.3452 
22 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.0741 
23 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.4569 
24 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.2875 
25 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.1266 
26 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.0244 
27 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.2511 
28 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.2522 
29 0 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.2466 
30 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.0397 
31 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.3640 
32 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2392 
33 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2083 
34 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.0910 
35 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0419 
36 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.4305 
37 0 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.3285 
38 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 0.4787 
39 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 0.4970 
40 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.2466 
41 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 0.2415 
42 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.3148 
43 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.4339 
44 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.2194 
45 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 0.0443 
46 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.2964 
47 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.25 -0.25 -0.0669 
48 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 -0.2797 
49 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 0.3398 
50 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 -0.1593 
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51 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 0.1182 
52 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 0.1789 
53 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 -0.0581 
54 0 -0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.35 -0.35 -0.2257 
55 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.4347 
56 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2045 
57 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4007 
58 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0925 
59 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.4868 
60 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.1742 
61 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.2058 
62 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.2956 
63 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3381 
64 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0257 
65 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.2102 
66 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0652 
67 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0842 
68 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2341 
69 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4328 
70 0 -0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1333 
71 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.1003 
72 0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1223 
73 0 -0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3322 
Table B.1 – Characteristics of Strategies: Initial Agent Beliefs for Experimental Network 
Diagrams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
            Experiment 1               Experiment 2 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 2 0.0004 0.0004  1 70 72 -0.0041 0.0055 
2 22 2 0.0005 0.0005  2 68 72 -0.0085 0.0011 
3 22 70 0.0010 0.0010  3 68 14 -0.0029 0.0067 
4 2 70 -0.0027 -0.0027  4 21 14 -0.0073 0.0023 
5 2 22 -0.0001 -0.0001  5 21 49 -0.0055 0.0041 
6 70 22 -0.0021 -0.0021  6 56 49 -0.0080 0.0016 
7 70 2 0.0015 0.0015  7 56 70 -0.0066 0.0030 
8 22 2 -0.0009 -0.0009  8 57 70 -0.0128 -0.0032 
9 22 37 0.0006 0.0006  9 57 13 -0.0096 0.0000 
10 2 37 -0.0031 -0.0031  10 58 13 -0.0153 -0.0058 
 
            Experiment 3               Experiment 4 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 39 -0.0124 0.0013  1 70 39 -0.0161 0.0017 
2 48 39 -0.0088 0.0049  2 48 39 -0.0102 0.0076 
3 48 21 0.0022 0.0159  3 48 21 0.0030 0.0208 
4 49 21 -0.0026 0.0111  4 49 21 -0.0014 0.0164 
5 49 40 0.0041 0.0178  5 49 72 0.0066 0.0244 
6 21 40 0.0050 0.0187  6 54 72 0.0098 0.0276 
7 21 49 0.0106 0.0243  7 54 23 0.0193 0.0371 
8 57 49 0.0109 0.0246  8 72 23 0.0221 0.0399 
9 57 21 0.0181 0.0318  9 72 29 0.0320 0.0498 
10 49 21 0.0159 0.0296  10 23 29 0.0321 0.0499 
            
 Experiment 5               Experiment 6 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 31 -0.0065 0.0017  1 70 23 -0.0135 0.0015 
2 48 31 -0.0025 0.0058  2 48 23 -0.0174 -0.0023 
3 48 39 0.0074 0.0156  3 48 21 -0.0041 0.0110 
4 49 39 0.0068 0.0150  4 49 21 -0.0113 0.0038 
5 49 40 0.0155 0.0237  5 49 48 -0.0062 0.0089 
6 39 40 0.0151 0.0233  6 13 48 -0.0059 0.0091 
7 39 23 0.0214 0.0296  7 13 49 0.0019 0.0169 
8 12 23 0.0199 0.0281  8 12 49 -0.0011 0.0140 
9 12 39 0.0269 0.0351  9 12 13 0.0065 0.0216 
10 13 39 0.0221 0.0304  10 49 13 0.0048 0.0199 
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Experiment 7               Experiment 8 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 55 0.2023 0.0003  1 70 70 -0.2024 -0.0003 
2 48 55 0.2000 -0.0021  2 69 70 -0.2058 -0.0037 
3 48 68 0.1952 -0.0068  3 69 21 -0.1928 0.0093 
4 49 68 0.1797 -0.0224  4 56 21 -0.1862 0.0158 
5 49 48 0.1738 -0.0282  5 56 49 -0.1734 0.0287 
6 21 48 0.1603 -0.0418  6 21 49 -0.1692 0.0328 
7 21 49 0.1601 -0.0419  7 21 48 -0.1612 0.0409 
8 48 49 0.1505 -0.0515  8 49 48 -0.1608 0.0413 
9 48 21 0.1483 -0.0537  9 49 21 -0.1540 0.0480 
10 49 21 0.1371 -0.0650  10 57 21 -0.1550 0.0470 
 
Experiment 9 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 70 21 0.0197 0.0413 
2 57 21 0.0167 0.0383 
3 57 48 0.0251 0.0467 
4 49 48 0.0217 0.0433 
5 49 57 0.0269 0.0485 
6 48 57 0.0223 0.0439 
7 48 49 0.0265 0.0481 
8 57 49 0.0226 0.0442 
9 57 48 0.0261 0.0477 
10 49 48 0.0215 0.0431 
 
Table B.2 – Characteristics of Strategies: Strategy Profile and Payoff Tables for Experimental 
Network Diagrams 
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Experiment 1A     Experiment 2A 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
 
Step 
# 
TB 
Strategy 
US 
Strategy 
Absolute 
Payoff 
Relative 
Payoff 
1 [69, 70] [23, 1] 0.0223 0.0439  1 [69, 70] [23, 73] 0.0014 0.0230 
2 [57, 39] [23, 1] 0.0138 0.0354  2 [39, 49] [23, 73] 0.0023 0.0239 
3 [57, 39] [13, 48] 0.0232 0.0448  3 [39, 49] [13, 1] 0.0083 0.0299 
4 [49, 2] [13, 48] 0.0142 0.0358  4 [57, 68] [13, 1] 0.0060 0.0276 
5 [49, 2] [57, 39] 0.0166 0.0382  5 [57, 68] [3, 21] 0.0102 0.0318 
6 [48, 13] [57, 39] 0.0098 0.0314  6 [31, 2] [3, 21] 0.0074 0.0290 
7 [48, 13] [49,48] 0.0146 0.0362  7 [31, 2] [20, 72] 0.0097 0.0313 
8 [12, 57] [49,48] 0.0095 0.0311  8 [12, 10] [20, 72] 0.0068 0.0284 
9 [12, 57] [40, 72] 0.0144 0.0360  9 [12, 10] [23, 31] 0.0088 0.0304 
10 [49, 48] [40, 72] 0.0091 0.0307  10 [29, 14] [23, 31] 0.0062 0.0277 
 
    
 11 [29, 14] [49, 40] 0.0083 0.0299 
 
    
 12 [13, 31] [49, 40] 0.0060 0.0276 
 
    
 13 [13, 31] [31, 29] 0.0076 0.0292 
 
    
 14 [49, 40] [31, 29] 0.0060 0.0276 
 
    
 15 [49, 40] [58, 67] 0.0079 0.0295 
 
    
 16 [31, 29] [58, 67] 0.0056 0.0272 
 
    
 17 [31, 29] [49, 57] 0.0076 0.0292 
 
    
 18 [23, 3] [49, 57] 0.0060 0.0276 
 
    
 19 [23, 3] [31, 48] 0.0088 0.0304 
 
    
 20 [57, 58] [31, 48] 0.0075 0.0291 
 
    
 21 [57, 58] [23, 54] 0.0103 0.0319 
 
    
 22 [31, 10] [23, 54] 0.0090 0.0306 
 
    
 23 [31, 10] [58, 68] 0.0112 0.0328 
 
    
 24 [23, 54] [58, 68] 0.0088 0.0304 
 
    
 25 [23, 54] [31, 10] 0.0110 0.0326 
 
    
 26 [68, 58] [31, 10] 0.0094 0.0310 
 
    
 27 [68, 58] [54, 23] 0.0120 0.0336 
 
    
 28 [31, 10] [54, 23] 0.0100 0.0316 
 
    
 29 [31, 10] [68, 49] 0.0120 0.0336 
 
    
 30 [23, 2] [68, 49] 0.0100 0.0316 
Table B.3 –   Sensitivity: Strategy Profile and Payoff Tables for Experiments 1A and 2A 
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